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

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सत्यं शिवं सुन्दरम्

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VISION OF ATHARVAVEDA AND NATURAL SCIENCES

by

V. B. CHOLKAR*

Preliminary Remarks ;

With the Vedic Seers it looks as if the creator's Universe, 'नामरूपात्मकं जगत्', visible or otherwise, is by itself their laboratory, the largest and a unique one. Their only apparatus is their intuitive inner vision. They simply do not care to wait and see whether their statements could ever be verified by posterity or not. Their statements are indeed very bold and assertive, whether they are made in the fields of natural, moral or metaphysical philosophies. The more the concept is found difficult to visualise or realize by men, the greater is their tendency to use the language of metaphors (*Rūpakālaṅkāra*). Their statements do not ever appear to belie them. This is due to what one may say their inner and intuitive vision or oneness with the universal intellect. (चित्).

In corroboration of the statements made above, given below are a few specimens from the *Atharvaveda* in the field of Natural Sciences alone.

Atharvavedic Definition of *Life* and *Death*:

I— *Cell, Fertilisation* and *Oxygen—Life* and *Death*.

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* (C/o 'Metcons', 32/1/6, A, Erandavana, Pune-4 Pin-411004).

The relevant verses (i.e. *Mantras*) in support of these concepts from the *Atharvaveda* are—

(1) अपानति प्राणति पुरुषो गर्भे अन्तरा । काण्ड–सूक्त-मन्त्र
यदा त्वं प्राण जिन्वस्यथ स जायते पुनः ॥ XI. 4-14

(2) प्राणमाहुर्मातरिश्वानं वातो ह प्राण उच्यते ।
प्राणे ह भूतं भव्यं च प्राणे सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ XI. 4-15

Meaning and Explanation of words in the verses above—पुरुषः = Male or Female infant (= भ्रूण := embryo, foetus, American spelling—*fetus*, used hereafter).

गर्भे अन्तरा = Inside the womb of the mother.

प्राणति = Inhales. अपानति = Exhales.

Thus प्राणति followed by अपानति constitutes a sort of expansion of the lungs of the infant followed by their contraction. This constitutes a sort of to and fro vibratory motion, (technically called in Mechanics, Simple Harmonic motion, abridged as S.H.M). The amplitude i.e. the range of motion depends upon the rate of प्राण and अपान motions.

According to सायणाचार्य the commentator of the *Atharvaveda*, पुरुषः i.e. the infant (भ्रूण) inside the गर्भ (womb of the mother) is the combined fertilized product of शुक्र i.e. the semen cell from the father of the infant and शोणित i.e. the ovum or egg—cell from its mother. Now cells, according to the modern sciences, require for 'their very existence and growth (i.e. the property of getting multiplied, 'एकोऽहं बहु स्याम्)' a continuous supply of प्राण-वायु (i.e. oxygen), as stated in both the verses above. The combined fertilized product, (physiologically and genetically complete) of the two cells is called the Embryo during the first twelve weeks after fertilization, but, is called Fetus, thereafter. Its growth requires nutrition and oxygen which is supplied through the juicy food supplied by the chemical conversion of the food taken in by the mother. The commentator सायण briefly puts all this by saying 'मातृभुक्ताहारपरिणतान्नरसेन 'जिन्वसि' i.e. पुष्यसि'. Thus its life is due to the continuous supply of प्राणवायु i.e. oxygen, as definitely stated in the second verse.

The existence of life indicated and felt externally by the beats of the heart of the grown up fetus can only be experienced by doctors after about twenty weeks or five months after fertilization. But the life and growth of the infant starts with the very instant of fertilization and continuous supply of oxygen in the womb of the mother through the juicy conversion of the food taken in by her. Popularly, howevers, but, incorrectly, life is said to begin after about five months of fertilisation.

The first verse finally states 'स जायते पुनः' i.e. the fetus is, as if, born and reborn since it lives and grows continuously by the process of inhaling and exhaling वायु. This वायु at inhaling is called 'प्राण' (वायु) i.e. oxygen and at exhaling 'अपान' (वायु) i.e. carbon dioxide. The fetus, as stated above, is the compound product of two different cells, semen (शुक्र) and ovum (शोणित). Further as is well-known from the biological sciences a cell continues to be kept alive only by the continuous process of respiration i.e. inhaling followed by exhaling or vice versa. Further the same *sciences* define a cell as a unit of life, i.e. the structural unit of all living organisms. It is formed of a substance called '*protoplasm*,' now called *cytoplasm*.' The '*cytoplasm*' normally contains '*nucleus*,' charged when active with a definite number of hair-like *rollets* called *chromosomes*.' The molecules of chromosomes carry the '*genetic code*.' The latter control the individual inherited or other characteristics of the cell organism. Every cell is separeted from its neighbours by a *membranous wall*. The human fetus consists of highly organized million million separats cells. Consequently a human fetus is a multi-cellular organism, a physiologically and genetically complete structure. This structure as stated in the first verse, is kept alive and grows by the continuous process of respiration viz. the प्राण and अपान functions.

The second verse indicates the source of प्राण (oxygen) and its life-long importance to human organism or in fact to every living organism in the universe. This verse gives the general name मातरिश्वन् to the deity of the complete and total mixture of gases existing in the अन्तरिक्षम् i.e. the global atmosphere surrounding the Earth. At the same time the verse further emphasises the importance of प्राणवायु i.e. oxygen in sustaining the existence and growth of the complex human structure ever since its birth, in particular and for all living organisms for all time in future. In fact it is the sole support for every born organism to continue to live. The withdrawal of its support any time in future defines what is called the '*Death*' of the organism. In particular in the case of the living *human* organism it is popularly called the '*Death*' of the living herson. That is why in this verse 'प्राण i.e. oxygen is called the whole and complete support of life by stating that in प्राण (oxygen) rests the complete story of life, 'प्राणे सर्वं प्रतिष्ठितम्'. The word सर्वम् 'stands for the past, 'भूतम्' and the future, 'भव्यम्' of the complex organism, popularly called शरीर (body).

It is difficult to find even in the modern biological sciences a *definition* of *Life* and *Death* of a living organism too of this order.

II. *Atharvavedic Method* of *Contraception* :

Relevant verses are—

(1) इमा यास्ते शतं हिराः सहस्रं धमनीरुत । काण्ड–सूक्त–मन्त्र
तासां ते सर्वासामहमश्मना बिलमप्यधाम् ॥ VII. 36.2

(2) परं योनेरवरं ते कृणोमि मा त्वा प्रजाभि भून्मोत सूनुः ।
अस्वां त्वाप्रजसं कृणोम्यश्मानं ते अपिधानं कृणोमि ॥ VII. 36.3

The first verse mentions the existence of many arteries and veins in the womb and of the Fallopian tubes which carry the ovum i.e. the egg-cell to the womb of a female, rendering her fit for conception. Further it also suggests the closing of the openings of these tubes by a stone which perhaps serves as a device for contracting the openings of the Fallopian tubes towards the womb, so as to prevent them from carrying the ovum to the womb.

The detailed exact process for closing the openings of the Fallopian tubes by a stone is however not described. For this the commentator Sāyaṇa invites the attention of the reader to the कौशिकसूत्रs on the *Atharvaveda*. These सूत्रs, however, suggest the rather doubtful method of charming the stone with *Mantra* VII. 36.1, after rubbing it with the urine of a she-mule, cooking its powder with boiled rice and then administering it to female concerned for eating and for annointing her ornaments with the charged powder, soaked in the urine of a she-mule.

The second verse further described how the woman is reduced to the status of a she-mule, which is rendered incapable of fertilization and consequently of bearing a child by conception. The means suggested in the first verse for rendering a female incapable of conception by closing the mouths of the Fallopian tubes by a stone-obstruction is repeated here.

The two verses taken together only suggest the extent of the then physiological knowledge of the human body and of the science of contraception.

Meanings of words in verses (1) and (2)—

(1) इमा: = These, या: = which, शतम् = hundred i.e. many.

हिरा: = Arteries and Veins, सहस्रम् = thousand i e. many.

धमनी: = Tubes (carrying egg-cells) i.e. Fallopian tubes.

According to सायणाचार्य–गर्भाशयस्य अवष्टम्भिका: बाह्या: स्थूला नाड्य: ।

ते = your's i.e. of the lady referred to in the verse.

तासां सर्वासां (नाडीनां) बिलम् (= मुखम्) = outlet of all these tubes (to the womb). अश्मना = With the help of a stone (= obstruction). अहम् = Myself (concerned in the experimental performance of contraception). अप्यधाम् = closed (covered outlets of tubes.) = आच्छादितवान् (सायण–यथा गर्भधारणक्षमा न भवन्ति तथा).

(2) ते = your's (i.e. of the lady having the contraception performed on (her). योने: परम् = (Womb) which exists beyond (परम्) the female organ of procreation (योनि:). अवरं कृणोमि = I make it (the womb) incapable of conceiving (= अवरम्). प्रजा female infant. सूनु: = male infant. उत = or मा अभि भूत् = May you not get.

अप्रजसम् = Without progeny (सायणाचार्य–त्वां अपत्यरहिताम्).

कृणोमि = I (so) perform (the experiment of contraception).

अश्मानम् = Stone (i.e. the obstruction (closing the outlet of tubes).

अपिधानम् = आच्छादनम् i e. the cover closing the outlet of tubes carrying egg-cells (ova). अश्वाम् = अश्वतरीम् = she-mule. त्वा अश्वाम् कृणोमि = I make you a she-mule (सायणाचार्य–यथा अश्वतरी स्त्रीलक्षणयुक्तापि प्रजारहिता तथा त्वां कृणोमि). ते = your's (openings of tubes.)

It remains to be seen, however, to what extent the present medical science can agree with the view-point of the *Atharvaveda* and further to find out to what extent the method suggested is feasible and/or agrees with any of the modern methods of contraception.

III. *Atharvavedic* and *Ṛgvedic Metaphor* for a *planet-to-planet space-flight* of a *satellite*.

The interpretation given below of the relevant verses from the *Atharvaveda* and *Ṛgveda* marks the height of metaphorical flight or imagination of the Vedic poets or seers concerned by whatever name they are called. This descriptive but a rather loose metaphor occurs in the *Atharvaveda* at V. 17 and in the *Ṛgveda* at X. 109.

The subject of the metaphorical legend is the abduction by a Kṣatriya of a Brahmin's wife from his house and her subsequant restoration to her husband's home under the advice and persuasive forces of other powerful sages.

This metaphorical legend is repeated in some greater details in the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* at IX. 14.7.

We first reproduce below the four relevant verses from the *Atharvaveda* and *Ṛgveda*. The original order of the verses in the text has been rearranged where necessary to enable us to give a connected account of the metaphorical legend and the corresponding Astronomical interpretation.

(1) तेऽवदन् प्रथमा ब्रह्मकिल्बिषेऽकूपारः सलिलो मातरिश्वा । अथर्ववेद V. 17.1
वीडुहरास्तप उग्रं मयोभूरापो देवीः प्रथमजा ऋतस्य ॥ ऋग्वेद X. 109.1

(2) भीमा जाया ब्राह्मणस्यापनीता दुर्धां दधाति परमे व्योमन् । अथर्ववेद V. 17.6
देवा वा एतस्यामवदन्त पूर्वे सप्तऋषयस्तपसा ये निषेदुः ॥ ऋग्वेद X. 109.4

(3) ब्रह्मचारी चरति वेविषद् विषः स देवानां भवत्येकमङ्गम् । अथर्ववेद V. 17.5
तेन जायामन्वविदद् बृहस्पतिः... ... ... ॥ ऋग्वेद X. 109.5

(4) सोमो राजा प्रथमो ब्रह्मजायां पुनः प्रायच्छदहृणीयमानः । अथर्ववेद V. 17.2
अन्वर्तिता वरुणो मित्र आसीदग्निर्होता हस्तगृह्या निनाय ॥ ऋग्वेद X. 109.2

Given below are the meanings and explanations of some words, sentences and concepts in the four verses above, followed by the corresponding metaphorical mention of scientific ideas from Astronomy.

Verse (1)—

The prominent (प्रथम) Gods, Sun (अकूपार:). Varuṇa (सलिल), Vāyu (मातरिश्वा), Fire (अग्नि-fierce तप उग्र and वीडुहरा:-wide consuming), सोम (the source of happiness) were the first to notice (or rather bring about) agitation in the household systems. (a planet and its satellite). of ब्रह्मा = (बृहस्पति = Jupitor, the preceptor of all Gods and the lord of speech). The domestic agitation was a consequence of the ill-fate, sin (a weakness) i.e. किल्बिष of Bṛhaspati.

The Astronomical correspondence suggests agitation i.e effective weakness in the gravitational attraction of the satellite (i.e. here जुहू, wife of the planet बृहस्पति in the legend) towards him. This fault was detected first by the natural lords of the five basic elements, Sun, water, wind, fire and coolness. The weakening of the gravitational field of Jupiter (बृहस्पति) was perhaps a consequence of the strong gravitational distrurbance generated by powerful stars in its astronomical neighbourhood. (It may be noted that all distances and effects here are on an astronomical scale). In fact the agitation in the family-system of Jupiter and its satellite may have been detected first as a consequence of the violent atmospheric changes brought about by the lords of the five basic elements under the influence of some powerful stars in Jupiter's astronomical neighbourhood. This is, however, a guess.

Verse (2)—

" Fierce (भीमा) would be the abducted (अपनीता) wife (जाया) of Brahman (= बृहस्पति, the Jupiter). She would plant chaos (दुर्धां दधाति) in the uppermost heaven (परमे व्योमन्) ". Thus said about her (एतस्यामवदन्त) the Gods of old (पूर्वे देवा:) Seven Ṛṣis (सप्तर्षय:) who (ये) sat down (निषेदु:) for their austere devotion (तपस्).

Metaphorically, the satellite of Jupiter was compelled to leave its orbit under the strong gravitational disturbing effect of powerful neighbouring stars. (Further as implied in the fourth verse below the satallite entered the orbit of another planet सोम i.e. perhaps the Moon, as suggested in the corresponding portion of the legend in the भागवत पुराण at IX. 14.7).

Verse (3)—

The tribunal of seven sages suggested above in verse (2) detected that बृहस्पति (Jupiter) now being left alone without the satellite (भवत्येकमङ्गम्) was incapable of carrying out his former assigned celestial (divine) duties (वेविषद् विष: संखानाम्) moved about irregularly at random in the heavens (ब्रह्मचारी). As a consequence the tribunal decided to restore जुहू to her former household (i.e. बृहस्पति's home). As a consequence बृहस्पति got back his wife (तेन जायामविन्दद् बृहस्पति:)

Metaphorically, it is suggested that as a combined gravitational effect of some prominent neighbouring stars, whose names appear below in verse (4), the satellite was forced out of its new orbit and restored back to its original orbit.

Verse (4)—

As a consequence of the decision of the tribunal (suggested in verse 2 above) the prominently important star (प्रथमो राजा, सोम: perhaps चन्द्रमा: as at भागवत-पुराण), now not feeling abashed (अहृणीयमान:) about जुहू's abduction and accompanied by the consenting (अन्वर्तिता;) वरुण, as also मित्र and अग्नि, the priest of gods (होता) carries (निनाय) बृहस्पति's wife (ब्रह्मजाया) by hand (as if personally) (हस्तगृह्या) restoring her (पुन: प्रायच्छत्) back to बृहस्पति.

Metaphorically, under the gravitational effect jointly generated by the stars सोम, वरुण, मित्र and अग्नि, the satellite found no difficulty leaving its new orbit round सोम (चन्द्रमा: possibly) and returning to its original orbit round the planet बृहस्पति (Jupiter).

Thus are established the reasons for quitting home by the wife of the sage बृहस्पति due to some domestic agitation, discussion among other eminent sages about her faultlessness, agreement among them to restore her back actually to her husband's home as also their capacity to take her back home personally as a consequence of their austere penance. Thus as pointed above from place to place the metaphorical correspondence is complete in all respects.

It must be emphatically stated in the end that the metaphorical circumstances and description above agrees with the actual Aero-space satellite flight to the Moon from our Mother Earth and back to it, so successfuly carried out by our scientists.

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PRINCIPLES OF VEDIC EXEGESIS AND THE PASPAŚĀHNIKA OF MAHĀBHĀṢYA

By

C. Rajendran*

While Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is a monument of perfection in descriptive grammar, Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* is a mine of information relating to the methodology of interpretation of grammatical rules. It also discusses fundamental problems connected with the philosophy of grammar. The first *āhnika* of *Mahābhāṣya* called *Paspaśā*, is actually a learned preface to grammar, dealing with many interesting philosophical problems of grammar, like the phenomenon of sound, meaning, the aims and objectives of grammar, methodology of grammatical studies, the problem whether word and meaning are eternal, the connotations of the term '*vyākaraṇa*,' and so forth. The importance of the *paspaśāhnika* in the study of grammar has been brought forth by Māgha, through double entendre, in the following verse :

> *anutsūtrapadanyāsa sadvṛttiḥ sannibandhanā* /
> *śabdavidyeva no bhāti rājanītirapaspaśā*[1] /

Grammatical studies originated in India as an ancillary of the sacred literature, Veda, with a view to preserve Vedic *mantras* etc., properly. Grammar is described as a *vedāṅga*, an ancillary of the Vedas. Pāṇini's grammar, written in *sūtra* style, for brevity, and arranged ingeniously with specific teleological order, requires further elaborations and clarifications since it is not susceptible to easy interpretation. This is a general feature of *sūtra* literature itself, to which class *Aṣṭādhyāyī* belongs. The other *vedāṅgas* in *Śikṣā, Kalpa, Jyotiṣa, Chandas* and *Nirukta* were also composed in *sūtra* form according to tradition though the *sūtra* works of many of them are not extant.[2]

The description of grammar as a *vedāṅga* is, apart from its historical significance, important from a methodological point of view also, since the conceptualisation of grammar as a discipline has been greatly influenced by the

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[1] Māgha, *Śiśupālavadha* II.112.

[2] Macdonell A. A. *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, 3rd Impression, Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1972, p. 266.

trend of systematisation prevalent during the post-*mantra* phase of the Vedic period. A perusal of *Mahābhāṣya*, especially its *Paspaśāhnika*, shows that many of the rules interpreting the Veda are adopted in it. Many principles taken for granted by Patañjali are explicitly seen in the Brahmanical literature and systematically worked out in the later *Mīmāṁsā* philosophy. It will be interesting to examine how far these exegetical principles have been applied by Patañjali in his interpretation of grammar and discussions of fundamental problems in the *Paspaśāhnika*.

A dominant trend seen in the *Mīmāṁsā* philosophy which is probably rooted in the Brahmanical literature is the systematic demarcation of the activities of the supra-mundane sphere from those of the mundane level. The Vedic injunctions, and prohibitions, it has been made clear, are applicable to the former sphere only. It is not the concern of the Veda to prescribe rules and regulations applicable to worldly conduct which can be comprehended by common sense following social conventions.[3] In other words, what the Veda exclusively prescribes are rites and ceremonies and not ordinary activities like eating food when hungry, etc. The special significance of the term '*dharma*' should be mentioned in this connection. *Dharma* has been defined as 'that which is purposeful and prescribed by the Veda.[4]

The main concern of *Mīmāṁsā*, is with *dharma*, as is evident from the first *sūtra* of Jaimini, '*athāto dharmajijañāsā*'. The Vedas are not relevant in the consideration of other secular matters which can be understood by means of empirical methods.

Very interestingly, this two-fold demarcation is implicitly recognised by Patañjali while prescribing '*Śabdaśuddhi* (purity of sound, especially in matters of pronunciation). The professed aim of grammar is the demarcation of correct sounds from the incorrect. Though Patañjali, time and again proclaims that only correct words should be employed, it is during the ceremonial occasion only that it is insisted upon as an invioble rule. The several stories and direct injunctions, detailed in the *Mahābhāṣya* are closely connected with ceremonial occasions of various rituals and not with ordinary transactions of the world. It is at the time of the recitation of *mantras* that the *asuras* wrongly pronounced '*he*' *arayo naśyaddh-*

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[3] Cf. M. Hiriyanna: On the *mīmāṁsā* position : 'While the standard of judgment for common morality is human, that for Dharma is Superhuman'. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*. George Allen and Unwitn Limited, London, 1932, p. 327.

[4] '*Vedena prayojanamuddiśya vidhīyamānortho dharmaḥ*' (*Mīmāṁsānyāyaprakāśaḥ* Ed. by MM. V. S. Abhyankar Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1937 pp. 3-4.

vam' as '*helayo naśyoddhvam*' and were succumbed.[5] In another story, Tvaṣṭā mispronounces the term '*indraśatru*' with wrong accent. also during the ceremonial *abhicāra karma*, only to get a child Vṛtra, who, instead of slaying Indra, was slain by the latter.[6] Again, one other proof driving home the necessity of grammatical knowledge is the prescription of *sārasvata iṣṭi* as a remedial measure for committing *apaśabda* after igniting the sacrificial fire. All these injunctions, as can be readily seen, are connected with sacrificial occasion (*yajña karma*). It is noteworthy that, the rules of grammar, though professedly universal are not so rigid in actual practice in worldly transactions. The only example cited from worldly transactions to demonstrate the necessity of grammar is the occasion of greeting back (*pratyabhivāda*) of a person who comes back after *vipravāsa*. The formal greeting, on such occasions is like '*abhivādaye devadatto* ' *haṃ bhoḥ*' and the greeting back is '*āyuṣmānbhava devadattā* with the *pluta* elongation of the final vowel.[7] Suppose a person, to be greeted ceremoniously does not know to greet back pronouncing the *pluta* vowel properly, he is not to be greeted in this formal way, since he does not know grammar. He will simply be greeted as '*ayamaham*'.[8] Here, the pertinent point to be noted is that the result of the lack of proficiency in grammar is only social inferiority and not any moral condemnation as such.

The distinction between the sacred and secular functions of grammar is implicit in another example illustrated by Patañjali also. Patañjali refers to a group of sages, called '*yarvōṇastarvāṇaḥ*', probably in a humorous vein. They had realised *dharma* and known the essence of this world and the other world. They had known what is to be known and realised the truth. However, they used to pronounce the words '*yadvānastadvānaḥ*' as *yarvāṇastarvāṇah*'. Patañjali points out that this by itself did not cause any evil results for them since the sages did not commit any grammatical lapses during the sacrificial ceremony.[9] This story is very remarkable in that it illustrates clearly that precision and purity, insisted in grammar is relevant chiefly on sacrificial occasions only, though it is desirable in ordinary usage also.

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[5] Patañjali, *Mahābhāṣya*, text with *Pradīpa* commentary of Kaiyaṭa and *Udyota* sub-commentary of Nāgeśa. (Ed.) Bhargava Sastri, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1945.

[6] *Ibid*. p. 30. Though *Pradīpa* clarifies Vṛtra as the person committing the error, as per *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (2.5.2), it was actually *Tvaṣṭā*. See the editorial notes on *Māhābhāṣya*, p. 31.

[7] This is as per the Pāṇinian *Sūtra*, *Pratyabhivāde śūdre*. (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 8.2.82).

[8] Patañjali, *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

[9] *Ibid*,, p. 73.

An interesting feature of the Vedic injunctions, assumed in the *mīmāṁsā* philosophy, especially in the *Prābhākara* school, is what may be termed the autonomy of Veda. The Vedic injunctions are to be obeyed for their own sake, without any consciousness of the results accruing from them. It is in the case of *nitya* type of duties like *sandhyāvandana* that this point becomes very pertinent. They are to be performed always and unlike the *kāmya* type of acts, they have no direct results attached to them. While the *Bhāṭṭa* school postulates the warding off evils, accruing from *non*-performance of them as the positive result of the *nitya karmas* (*nityāni akaraṇe pratyavāya sādhanāni*), the more traditional Prābhākaras reject this ground about explanation, and maintain that they are to be obeyed for their own sake. The very aim of the performance of the duties is the obeyance of the Vedic dictum and no other purpose should be sought in this.

It is significant that Patañjali adopts the autonomous concept of Veda when, at the outset, he speaks about the necessity of the study of grammar. The " *Prayojanas* " listed for grammatical studies are *rakṣā, ūha, āgama, laghu* and *asandeha*. Among them, *āgama* should be regarded as ' *Prayojanaḥ* ' in the masculine gender. As per the *Pradīpa* commentary of Kaiyaṭa it is described as signifying that scripture (*āgama*) enjoins the study of grammar as a *nitya karma*.[10] Patañjali also maintains here that grammar should be studied because Veda enjoins one to do so. Here it is clearly laid down that the Vedic injunction, relating to the study of grammar is to be obeyed without any consciousness of fruit. (' *brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmaḥ ṣaḍaṅgo vedo ' dhyeyo jñeyaśca* '). "[11]

With regard to the function of grammar, Patañjali cites the parallel of injunctions (*vidhi*) to explain the scope and sphere of the operation of grammatical rules. At the outset of the treatment of the problem, he makes it clear that it is not the concern of the grammarian to create words anew. The language extant is available for worldly transactions. Grammar simply tries to restrict usage to the correct words in the language which consists of pure and impure words.[12] However, language exists independant of grammar. In order to illustrate this principle, Patañjali cites the parallel of secular and Vedic injunctions. Eating of a cock nurtured in a village is prohibited in the world by the secular

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[10] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] ' *lokato 'rthaprayukte Śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate* ' Patañjali, *Op, cit.*, p.65.

(i.e. non-vedic) injunction, (' *abhakṣyo grāmyakukkuṭaḥ*). Analysing the implication of this prohibition, Patañjali states that this does not ask people to eat something when hungry. Eating food when one is hungry is instinctive and needs no specific injunction. However, it is possible to allay hunger by means of food like the flesh of a dog. It is at this juncture that the injunction prescribes that certain types of foods are forbidden.[13] Another instance, suggested by Patañjali is the question of resorting to the company of a woman when instinct prompts one to do so, but this is subjected to the consideration whether the particular woman is forbidden or not.[14]

The *bhāṣya* cites some Vedic dicta also to illustrate the function of grammar. The Veda prescribes certain dietary restrictions to various castes : '*payovrato brāhmaṇaḥ, yavāgūvrato rājanyaḥ, āmikṣāvrato vaiśyaḥ*.' Food is for consumption; any food can be taken for this. It is in this context that Veda enjoins certain restrictions for diet in the case of different people. Similarly, other restrictive injunctions like '*bailvaḥ khādiro vā yūpaḥ syād*' and '*agnau kapālānyadhiśritya abhimantrayate*: *bhṛgūṇāmaṅgirasām vā tapasā tapyaddhvam* etc.' also do not enjoin natural activities anew; they simply impose śāstraic restriction in things which may be theoretically performed in unspecified manner.[15]

The Vedic tradition of grammatical studies can be clearly seen also in the reference to *dīrghasatra* as an analogy of the prescription of non-current words in grammar. Grammar is based on usage; but there are many words like *ūṣa, tera, cakra, peca* etc. formulated by grammar, which are out of use. The *Pūrvapakṣin* here raises the objection that such formulations invalidate the grammarians' contention that grammar is based on usage. In reply to this, Patañjali, among other things, cites the explanation of *dīrghasatra*s or sacrifices which are to last for many years. Such ceremonies last for hundreds and thousands of years. Though they are not current in practice, their details are recorded in the *Kalpasūtras* just for the sake of preserving the tradition. This parallel also indicates that Vedic models of sacrifices etc. exerted great influence in the concept of grammar.

The above rapid survey of some features of the *Paspaśāhnika* amply shows that grammar rose and developed as a discipline in the capacity of a *vedāṅga*. The *vedāṅga*s are ancillaries to the Vedic studies; from Patañjali's treatment, it is clear that the main aim of grammar is the preservation of the Vedas and assisting in the correct performance of sacrifices, which involve accuracy of pronunciation and frequent adaptations of *mantras* with modifications in case forms etc., as well as the correct understanding of the Vedic prescriptions. It is true that secular aspects of language received greater importance in later grammar; even Pāṇini's grammatical system gives exhaustive treatment of the languages of the common use. But it must not be forgotten that originally grammar was oriented as a *vedāṅga*. It is not surprising that Patañjali turns to principles of Vedic interpretation to clarify methodological problems in the course of his discussions.

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[13] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.* p. 67.

[16] *Ibid.* p. 70.

DATE-WISE CHRONOLOGY OF RĀMA'S LIFE (BASED ON THE SKANDA PURĀṆA)

By

G. V. TAGARE*

Rāma story has an abiding international attraction. To East Asians, Rāma was their countryman and the story travelled to India from their land[1] which shows the spread of the story in Thailand, Java, Sumatra etc. We perform ceremoniously the birth-day celebrations of Rāma on *Caitra Śukla Navamī*. But few of us—including professional Haridāsas know the exact date of the happenings in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. For example, in what month and on what *Tithi* Sītā was abducted or on what *Tithi* and month building of the *Setu* was begun or completed. It appears that an ancient anonymous devotee of Rāma has prepared the datewise and monthwise chronology of important events in the life of Rāma. It was incorporated by the last redactor of the *Skanda Purāṇa*, in the 30th Chapter of the *Dharmāraṇya Khaṇḍa* of the III Book, viz. *Brahma Khaṇḍa*. As Dr. P. V. Kane[2] shows the *Skanda* is not later than the 9th Century A.D., the composer of this chronology must have lived 12 centuries ago.

The unique feature of this chronology is that like the Rāma-story in the *Mahābhārata*, the outline of Rāma-story as told by Nārada to Vālmīki and the authentic portion of *Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa* in its critical edition, it ends with the *Yuddha Kāṇḍa*. It completely ignores the *Uttara Kāṇḍa* which contains Blasphemous acts attributed to Rāma. In view of modern explosive criticism of Rāma by some modern scholars, it is worth while to know what a researcher of the 8th or the 9th Century A.D. recorded about Rāma.

The enclosed tabular statement is based on the verses in the 30th chapter of the *Skanda Purāṇa* mentioned above. It may appear rather hasty or sketchy to some. But I have faithfully recorded it as in that Text.

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* 3, A-4, Paranjape Housing Scheme, Near Auto India, Sangali-416 415.

[1] Raghavan V., *The Rāmāyaṇa Tradition in Asia*, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 1980.

[2] Kane, P. V., *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1958, Vol. V, p. 912.

Date-Wise Chronology of Rāma's Life (Months and Tithis)

(Based on *Skanda Purāṇa-Brahma Khaṇḍa-Dhramāraṇya Khaṇḍa* Chapter 30)
Abbreviations: Skl.: *Śukla Pakṣa*; Vd.: *Vadya Pakṣa*

	Incident	*Tithi & Month*	*Verse no. of the 30th chapter*
1.	Rāma's marriage (Rāma: Age 15) (Sītā: Age: 6 years!)	Not mentioned	8-9
2.	Rāma's age. 27. Exiled for 14 years	Not mentioned	15-16
3.	(After 13 years and a half) in the forest: Sītā abducted	*Māgha* Vd. 8, on *Vṛnda Muhūrta*	22-23
4.	Jaṭāyu killed	*Māgha* Vd. 9	28
	(No dates are mentioned of the incidents that took place between abduction of Sītā and Māruti's " discovery " of Sītā)		
5.	Māruti locates Sītā	*Mārgaśīrṣa* Skl. 12	36-37
6.	Burning of Laṅkā	*Mārgaśīrṣa* Skl. 13	39
7.	Māruti's report to Rāma with Sītā's crest-jewell	*Mārgaśīrṣa* Vd. 7	41-42
8.	Rāma marches with his army against Laṅkā	*Mārgaśīrṣa* Vd. 8 *Uttarā Phālgunī, Vijaya Muhūrta* at 12 noon	42-43
9.	After a journey of 7 days the army reaches the sea-shore	*Mārgaśīrṣa* Vd. 15	45
10.	Camped on the sea-shore	*Pauṣa* Skl. 1 to 3	45
11.	Bibhīṣaṇa joins Rāma	*Pauṣa* Skl. 4	46
12.	Discussion about crossing the sea.	*Pauṣa* Skl. 5.	46
13.	Rāma's fast and prayer to the sea. Consent and guidance from the sea-god.	*Pauṣa* Skl. 6-9	47
14.	*Setu*-building commenced	*Pauṣa* Skl. 10	48
15.	Completion of *Setu*	*Pauṣa* Skl. 13	48
16.	Rāma's army camps on Mt. Suvela	*Pauṣa* Skl. 14	48
17.	Rāma's army crosses the sea by the *Setu*	*Pauṣa* Skl. 15 to Vd. 2	49
18.	Rāma deploys his forces and besieges Laṅkā	*Pauṣa* Vd. 3 to 10	50
19.	Śuka and Sāraṇa visit Rāma's army in cognition	*Pauṣa* Vd. 11 & 12 .	51 . . .

Incident	*Tithi & Month*	*Verse No.*
20. Śārdūla reports to Rāvaṇa about Rāma's army and strategy	*Pauṣa* Vd. 13	52
21. Rāvaṇa arranges defence	*Pauṣa* Vd. 13 to 15	53
22. Aṅgada's negotiations	*Māgha* Skl. 1	53
23. Battles between the armies of Rāma and Rāvaṇa	*Māgha* Skl. 2 to 8	54-55
24. Indrajit binds Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa in *Nāga-pāśa*	*Māgha* Skl. 9 at night	55
25. Garuḍa releases Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa	*Māgha* Skl. 10	57
26. Temporary Truce for 2 days	*Māgha* Skl. 10 & 11	58
27. Māruti kills Dhūmrākṣa	*Māgha* Skl. 12	58
28. Māruti kills Akaṁpana—Illusory Sītā shown to be killed	*Māgha* Skl. 13	59
29. Nīla kills Prahasta	*Māgha* Skl. 14, 15 & Vd. 1	
30. Fight between Rāma and Rāvaṇa-Rāvaṇa is defeated	*Māgha* Vd. 2, 3, 4,	61-62
31. Efforts to waken up Kumbhakarṇa	*Māgha* Vd. 5-8	62
32. Kumbhakarṇa's fight with Rāma's army. He eats up monkeys.	*Māgha* Vd. 9-15	63-64
Rāma kills Kumbhakarṇa	*Māgha* Vd. 15	
33. Five demons, Narāntaka etc. are killed	*Phālguna* Skl. 1-4	65
34. Atikāya is killed	*Phālguna* Skl. 5-7	66
35. Kumbha & Nikumbha are killed	*Phālguna* Skl. 8-12	66-67
36. Makarākṣa is killed	*Phālguna* Skl. 13 to Vd. 1	67
37. Indrajit's victory	*Phālguna* Vd. 2	67
38. Temporary truce for medical treatment	*Phālguna* Vd. 3 to 7	68
39. Illusory Sītā killed. Grief-stricken Rāma suspends fighting	*Phālguna* Vd. 8	69
40. Fight between Lakṣmaṇa and Indrajit. Indrajit is killed	*Phālguna* Vd. 9-13	70
41. Temporary truce	*Phālguna* Vd. 14	71
42. Rāvaṇa comes to fight	*Phālguna* Vd. 15 (*Amāvāsyā*)	71
43. Rāma-Rāvaṇa fight	*Caitra* Skl. 1-8	72-73
44. Lakṣmaṇa unconscious due to a *Śakti*. Rāma drives out Rāvaṇa from the battle-field	*Caitra* Skl. 9	71-74

Incident	*Tithi & Month*	*Verse No.*
45. Māruti brings Viśalyā from Droṇāgiri. Battle breaks out at night	*Caitra* Skl. 10	75
46. Mātali brings a chariot for Rāma	*Caitra* Skl. 11	76
47. Duel fight between Rāma & Rāvaṇa for 18 days & Rāvaṇa is killed	*Caitra* Skl. 12 to Vd. 14	77
48. Rāvaṇa is cremated	*Caitra* Vd. 15	78
Thus this war lasted for 87 days Less Truce for 15 days. Duration of the actual War is 72 days	*Māgha* Skl. 2 to *Caitra* Vd. 14	79-80
49. Rāma camps on the battlefield.	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 1	80
50. Bibhīṣaṇa crowned	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 2	80
51. Sītā's Fire-ordeal.	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 3	81
52. Rāma returns with Sītā, Lakṣmaṇa in the Puṣpaka aerial chariot.	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 4	83
53. Camp at Bhāradvāja's Hermitage Completion of the period of exile for 14 years	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 4	84
54. Rāma arrives at Nandigrāma to Bharata	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 6	86
55. Rāma crowned on the throne of Ayodhyā (Rama's age: 42)	*Vaiśākha* Skl. 7	86

Sītā was in the captivity of Rāvaṇa for 14 months and 10 days.

(Verse 86-87) Here ends the story of Rāma. The concluding verse is as follows :

> *Daśa-varṣa-sahasrāṇi daśa-varṣa-śatāni ca /*
> *Rāmo rājyaṁ Pālayitvā jagāma tridivālayam // 90 //*

" Having protected the kingdom for 11000 years Rāma went to the abode of gods ".

In Rama's kingdom, the subjects were very happy (Verses 91 to 101).

The story agrees with that in the *Mahābhārata-Vana-Parva*, the outline of Rāma's life as given by Nārada and *Vālmiki Rāmāyaṇa Yuddha Kāṇḍa* which concludes with benedictory verses showing the end of the original Rāma-Story. *The author of the Skanda Purāṇa does not believe in the authenticity of Uttara Kāṇḍa.* Hence no reference to banishment of Sītā or killing of Śaṁbūka is made by him. It means that some 1200 years ago (the probable date of this writer) Rāma story was believed to end with *Yuddha Kāṇḍa*.

IS THE RĀMĀYAṆA A HEROIC EPIC?

By

VIJAYA GUTTAL*

The *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* with their explicitly religious and spiritual vision of life have set a distinct standard for themselves in the world epic poetry. It is true that an epic poem wherever created is "the ensouled image of a great culture,"[1] and only the epic can give an appropriate expression to the essential grandeur and nobility of man. Even when the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* share this essential epic vision with the other epics of the world, they are basically moulded and nourished by a deeply religious and spiritual attitude to life. But some scholars both Indian and Western, have attempted to annex the Indian epics to the category of the Heroic epic tradition prevalent in the West. The heroic epic of the West presents a clearly defined conception of manhood and honour. In a heroic epic like the *Iliad*, the hero pays the highest value to personal honour and glory and exults in his physical prowess. The battle ground is the place where he can prove his true worth. The thirst for fame and glory for oneself characterises the heroic ideal. Personal honour becomes the centre of such heroes for which they live and die. As C. M. Bowra, a Homeric Scholar, says "....their chief claim is the pursuit of honour through risk."[2] Thus a heroic epic celebrated the actions of a Heroic Age which is believed to occur when, "... a people passes from its savage to its heroic age, on its way to some permanence of civilization".[3] During this stage the emphasis is on the assertion of one's individuality. Hence, in reality, the ancient Greek epics, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* celebrate the ideals of a lost 'heroic age', of fierce individualism, a strong sense of individual courage and honour as a means of immortality in a world largely devoid of significance.[4]

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[1] Śri Aurobindo, *The Foundations of Indian Culture*, Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1968, p. 330.

[2] Bowra, C. M., *Heroic Poetry*, Macmillan, London 1966, p. 4.

[3] Abercrombie L., *The Epic: An Essay*, Martin Secker (Number Five John Street Adelfine), London, 1922, p. 9.

[4] Malagi R. A., Prof. *The Western Epic Tradition*, pub. by Gujarat Univ., Ahmedabad, 1982, p. 1.

But the spirit of such self-glorification seen in the heroic epics is alien to the spirit of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Because the *Rāmāyaṇa* celebrates the self-less ideal of *dharma* and spiritual heroism and the human action in it achieves its value against the background of these ideals. The significance of the Indian epic is in the fact that it explicates lucidly the values of the Vedic tradition. The *Rāmāyaṇa* has its spiritual moorings in the precepts set by the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. Therefore, Śri Aurobindo endorses that, "The Vedas and the Upaniṣads are not only the sufficient fountainhead of Indian philosophy and religion but of all Indian art, poetry, and literature. It was the soul, the temperament, the ideal mind formed and expressed in them which later carved out the great philosophies, built the structure of *Dharma* . . ."[5] The *Rāmāyaṇa* which inherits such a sacred body of religious literature communicating the eternal values, could not have been a product of a mere Heroic age which has just left barbarism behind. On the other hand, it embodies a vision of the integral life of man based on the adherence to the '*puruṣārthas*'. *Dharma*, the foundational '*puruṣārtha*' is the very essence of the life and characters of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. It proves the belief that "Spiritual life is the true genius of India. Those who make the greatest appeal to the Indian mind are not the military conquerors,.. but the holy sages, the *ṛṣis* who embody spirituality at its finest and purest".[6] Rāma and Sītā have captured the imagination of the Indian people for centuries by their self-less ideals and spiritual courage. However, the element of physical heroism is not absent from the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Hanūmān are some of the greatest heroes known for their prowess and valour. But here physical heroism is not an end in itself. On the other hand, it subserves the greater and more impersonal ideals of Truth and *Dharma*. It is harnessed to the achievement of these eternal values everywhere in the *Rāmāyaṇa* whereas the values of a heroic epic are essentially self-destructive as illustrated in the *Iliad*.

In such a context, the attempt of the scholars to trace a heroic past in the Indian epics and to measure them by Western standards indicates a wilful ignorance of the uniqueness of the native epic tradition. Such an attempt also leads to self-contradictory criticism of which N. K. Sidhanta's book '*The Heroic Age of India*' is a good example. The author here has made an effort to trace the evidences of a Heroic Age in India according to the Western concept. Commenting on the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Sidhanta writes, "With the *Rāmāyaṇa* we are on a different plane. There is no heroic nucleus as in the *Mahābhārata*.... even though the *Rāmāyaṇa* does not have the didactic overgrowth of the

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[5] Śri Aurobindo, *The Foundations of Indian Culture*, Aurobindo Ashram, Birth Centenary Library, Pondichery, 1972, Vol. 14, p. 280.

[6] Radhakrishnan S., *The Cultural Heritage of India*, Ramakrishna Mission, Calcutta, rep. 1970, Vol. 1, p. xxiii.

Mahābhārata, it seems the product of an age of polish and culture quite distinct from the 'barbarism' of the Heroic Age."[7] He recognises the fact that the nucleus of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is not heroic in the Western sense of the term and also that it reflects a greater culture absent in the barbarism of a heroic epic. In spite of this awareness, he contradicts himself when he writes of Vālmīki that, "He has tried to reproduce the atmosphere of the heroic past; he has taken his characters from old heroic legend and attempted to make them act according to heroic standards. But his heroes are animated with the ideas and sentiments of his own age and these do not at all harmonise with the deeds of blood they perform."[8] It is paradoxical that the *Rāmāyaṇa*, even when it does not have a heroic nucleus and belongs to an age of culture and polish should still reproduce the atmosphere of the heroic past. Only if one narrows one's vision, one can say that the ideas and actions of the heroes of the *Rāmāyaṇa* do not harmonise. There is no other poem in Sanskrit literature more harmonious than the *Rāmāyaṇa*. When a critic fails to visualise the essential significance of the Indian epic, he will arrive at such conclusions.

C. M. Bowra, in his survey of the heroic poetry of the world, says, "I have excluded any literature which is not strictly heroic in the sense which I have given to the word. That is why nothing is said about the old Indian epics, in which a truly heroic foundation is overlaid with much literary and theological matter. . . . "[9] N. K. Sidhanta also talks of the epic version . . " . . in which the religious and the ethical interest has completely overshadowed the interest of heroic deeds and heroic characters. "[10] But perhaps, this whole conception of the religious interest overshadowing the heroic in Indian Literary tradition originates with the conjectures of Pargiter who wrote, ". . the traditions about kings and those about rishis must have been correspondingly separate, that is, there must have been two great streams of distinct tradition, ksatriya tradition and brahmanic tradition. "[11] But as everyone familiar with the ancient Indian form of society knows, the *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kṣatriya* classes were only two sections of a highly organised religious society, the other two sections being *Vaiśya* and *Śūdra*. To separate these is to divide the Indian culture artificially. A society which had accepted the *puruṣārthas* of *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* as the composite values of life was essentially religious and the religious spirit pervaded the life of all the four sections of the society. The religious literature of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads do not cater to any one class, but to the whole society. Hence it is essential to realise that the religious element is inherent in the Indian culture. Referring to the beliefs of the distinct streams of *kṣatriya* and *brāhmaṇa* traditions, A. D. Pusalkar, one of the most balanced of Indian critics, comments aptly, " There is absolutely no foundation for these beliefs ".[12]

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[7] Sidhanta, N. K., *The Heroic Age of India*, Kegan Paul, London, 1929, pp, 88-89.

[8] Ibid., p. 88.

[9] Bowra C. M. *Op. cit.*, p.v.

[10] Sidhanta N. K. *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

[11] Pargiter F. E. *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, Repr. 1972, p. 5.

The only reason on which these scholars seem to base their conclusions is the fact that there are obvious resemblances of heroism and war between the heroic epics and the Indian epics. But what is obviously overlooked is that the heroism of a *kṣatriya* in an Indian epic is part of a larger ethical system and subserves *dharma* in the framework of the '*puruṣārthas*'. The *kṣatriya* class forms an essential part of the ancient traditional system of Indian society (*varṇāśrama dharma*) and cannot be isolated from the entire system. The life of heroism is the duty of a *kṣatriya* and as *kṣatriyas* were also the rulers they were called upon to protect the whole society. A *kṣatriya* exercised his utmost heroism for the restoration and the preservation of *dharma*. Hence a heroic deed is never isolated from the higher purpose. In their feats of heroic prowess and valour in war, the heroes of the Indian epics do resemble the heroes of the Western heroic epic. But in the Indian epics a war is never fought for the sake of personal honour and glory. The purpose of any war here is the validification of the good; for the destruction of *adharma* and for the restoration of *dharma*. Hence the spirit of Kṛṣṇa's words in the *Mahābhārata* echoes through the epics :

> " *Yadā yadā hi dharmasya glānirbhavati Bhārata |*
> *Abhyutthānamadharmasya tadātmānam sṛjāmyaham ||*
> *Paritrāṇāya sādhūnām vināśāya ca duṣkṛtām |*
> *Dharmasaṁsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge* " ||

" Whenever there is a decline of righteousness and rise of unrighteousness O Bhārata (Arjuna), then I incarnate Myself. For the protection of the good, for the destruction of the wicked and for the establishment of righteousness, I come into being from age to age ".[13]

In conformity with the divine purpose, the heroism of a *kṣatriya* is bound to the service of *dharma* and thus it finds its proper place in the larger purpose of the preservation of the good which in turn means the preservation of humanity.

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[12] Pusalkar A. D., " Purāṇas : Their Content ", *Indian Inheritance*, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1965, p. 107.

[13] Translated by S., Radhakrishnan *The Bhagavadgītā*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1948, IV. 7-8.

In this manner, the Indian epic rises much higher thant he private round of activities found in the heroic epic, giving heroism its proper place, and putting it to the service of greater ideals, as seen in the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

On the other hand, this is not the foundation on which the essence of the *Iliad*, the Greek epic, which alone answers the fullest implications of the term 'heroic' epic, is based. The heroes of the *Iliad* visualise personal heroism as the ultimate value and their fullest focus is on the honour achieved through deeds of heroism. The wrath of Achilles and his retaliation against the dishonour done to him provide ample opportunity to see how through a disregard for the life and welfare of others, he leads the Greeks towards a catastrophe for merely his personal satisfaction. He is in Troy not to fight for the cause of the Greeks or for Agamemnon but for his own glory. Sidhanta too has recognised this fact and so writes. "The interest of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey* is not in the advance of the Greek cause or in the exaltation of some Greek state. It is in the fortunes of Achilles and Agamemnon, of Hektor and Odysseus that we are interested; and the personal element is the most absorbing factor in polity and war. The Greeks are invading Troy, not from any national or patriotic motives, but to avenge the insult done to an individual Greek prince by a Trojan".[14] The abduction of Helen is not even a moral issue in the *Iliad* for whose sake the war is fought. Troy is doomed because Paris broke the law of host and guest. The utter brutality to which a hero of the heroic epic can descend is evident in Achilles's treatment of Hector's body after his death. He ties the legs of the dead Hector, the Greek Prince, to his chariot and drags the body in dust before the eyes of the old parents of the dead hero (*Iliad*. Bk. XXII). Such savagery and shameful outrage on the body of the vanquished enemy is possible only in a heroic epic. In depicting such acts of brutality Homer shows us human nature in the raw, its stark naked brutality. The greatness of Homer is in his recognition of this truth about human life.

Whereas in the broader perspective of the *Rāmāyaṇa* heroism and war do not reach to such depths of brutality. The abduction of Sītā is endowed with a moral and spiritual depth which the abduction of Helen does not know of. Rāvaṇa, who represents evil even before he abducts Sītā, commits the most sinful and immoral act when he takes her. For this act of *adharma*, it is as if the whole moral universe demands his destruction and his vessel of sins now overflows with his outrage against Sītā. Rāma fights Rāvaṇa in war not merely to recover his wife but to vanquish the forces of '*adharma*' represented by Rāvaṇa and his followers. Thus the personal motive, the domestic issue widens into an impersonal and cosmic issue. In his heroism in war Rāma is not vengeful like

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[14] *The Heroic Age of India*, p. 72.

Achilles but his only aim is to restore *dharma* by vanquishing the sinful Rāvaṇa, and recovery of Sītā is only part of it. Rāma doesn't kill indiscriminately and treats even the body of his enemy, Rāvaṇa with honour. He says, with rare nobility of heart,

Maraṇāntāni vairāṇi nirvṛttam naḥ prayojanam |
Kriyatāmasya saṁskāro mamāpyeṣa yathā tava || (VI. 112)

(Tr. " With death is the termination of enmities. Our purpose has been accomplished. Perform his last rites. He is (a brother) to me too, as he is to you).

Another instance of the deep sense of *dharma* inspiring a heroic deed is when Lakṣmaṇa draws an arrow to kill the unconquerable Indrajit, by involving the name of Rāma,

Dharmātmā satyasandhaśca Rāmo Dāśarathiryadi |
Pauruṣe cāpratidvandvaḥ Śarainam jahi Rāvaṇim || (VI. 78, 31)

(Tr. If Rāma is a man of *dharma*, truthful and the true son of Daśaratha and matchless in war, O arrow of mine, destroy Indrajit). There are innumerable instances of this kind in the *Rāmāyaṇa* because the whole epic breathes the spirit of the ancient value,

Satyameva jayate, nānṛtam

(Truth alone triumphs, not untruth)

Muṇḍakopaniṣad, 3.1.6.

The intention of the restoration of *dharma*, of the good in the *Rāmāyaṇa* is made still more clear at the end of the war. After the death of Rāvaṇa, Rāma crowns Vibhīṣaṇa, because he alone, of all the *asuras*, had sided with '*dharma*'. The intention is not the total destruction of Laṅkā as Troy is doomed to be destroyed in the *Iliad*. After restoring the forces of good to power Rāma returns to his own land.

But it is strange that such idealistic acts and expressions of Rāma appear to N. K. Sidhanta devoid of significance. He writes, " In place of expressions of undaunted courage and of defiance of even the gods we have helpless lamentations and pious moralisings from the hero. Faced with disaster, he does not show us the burning passion for vengeance but wastes his time in weak complaints and religious reflections ".[15]

He misses the underlying idealism of the epic in which heroism is only a part of Vālmīki's larger vision. In his zeal to draw analogies between the heroic and the Indian epic, he fails to realise that if in the *Iliad* heroism as a value, is an end in itself, the *Rāmāyaṇa* transcends it by employing the same heroism for the achievement of *dharma*. Like any great work of literature, the *Rāmāyaṇa* is deeply concerned with the victory of the forces of good over evil. Hence an objective critic like Monier Williams writes, "No one too can read either the *Rāmāyaṇa* or the *Māhabhārata* without a feeling that they rise above the Homeric poems in this—that a deep religious meaning appears to underlie all the narrative and that the wildest allegory may be intended to conceal a sublime moral, symbolising the conflict between good and evil and teaching the hopelessness of victory in so terrible a contest without purity of soul, self-abnegation and subjugation of the passions".[16] Thus the whole thrust of the *Rāmāyaṇa* is in the direction of the spiritual depth.

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[15] N. K. Sidhanta, *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

Homer's vision of heroism and the heroic epic have their own place in the history of the world epic poetry. But then the epic vision could not have stopped with the *Iliad.* The heroic epic of Homer conceives the tragic human destiny. The *Rāmāyaṇa* expands this vision and orientates it towards a higher purpose of the triumph of truth and *dharma* in which lies the ultimate destiny of man.

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[16] Williams, M. *Indian Wisdom*, Wm. H. Allen and Co., London, 1875, p. 426.

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SOME ASPECTS OF ŚĀNTIPARVAN

By

NATAVARLAL N. JOSHI*

Introduction

Within the scope of this short paper an attempt is made to discern the possibility of thought contents in germ form in the *Bhagavadgītā* developing into extensive discourses and discussions in the *Śāntiparva*.

Reading the two portions of the *Mahābhārata* provides an interesting co-relation, striking similitude and contrast both in situation and exposition, in the manner in which they deal with the subject and the matter they expound also reveal the unity of authorship. And all this is the result of free thought that moves throughout without any attempt at systematising.

The *Bhagavadgītā* which forms a part of the *Bhīṣma Parva* is set in the background of imminent war and Arjuna's feeling about war and its after-effects.

The *Śāntiparva* which is later in sequential order is also set in the background of war and Yudhiṣṭhira's feeling of distress at the after-effects of War. The one is prefixed and the other is affixed to war as if it were!

The two portions present the two great exponents of the sacred and the secular knowledge, that is, Kṛṣṇa in one and Bhīṣma in the other and the two worthy recipients of that knowledge, namely, Arjuna in one and Yudhiṣṭhira in the other.

Unity of thought and its manner of exposition can be easily discussed inspite of the difficulty to discern the genuine from the extensive digressions and the interpolated.

The resemblance also corroborates the proposition regarding the non-systematic character of the two portions.

In both the works we find the germs and noteworthy germs of a system and we have most of the raw material of a system. It is quite in keeping with the statement made in the *Ādiparva* that the work is originally aimed at an encyclopaedic creation.

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At the same time both the portions belong to the same days as some of the older Upaniṣads.

The consideration of the contents and the manner furnishes a strong argument that they both belong to an age prior to an age of system making.

In the general character the style also impresses one as quite archaic in its simplicity in both the portions.

Background : Consideration of the situation in which the two works are set in brings out a striking resemblance.

In the beginning of the *Bhagavadgītā* we find Arjuna in the pensive mood, occupied with thoughts of war, heavily weighing on his mind, leading to his refusal to fight against his own kith and kin. He prefers asceticism to the Kingship and Power. He prefers *Sannyāsa* and *bhaikṣya* to *Rājya*. The cause was very simple. Mankind was to be massacred mercilessly and it was all for the sake of power, pomp and glory. Acquiring Kingdom by killing one's own kith and kin was barbarous. He, therefore, preferred forest retreat to reigning an empire.

When Kṛṣṇa, the repository of knowledge both sacred and secular advised him to abide by his duty as a *Kṣatriya* and the dialogue that followed unfolded the mystery of the individual self and the Universal one, the secret of life and the worldly existence.

Likewise, in the beginning of the *Śāntiparva* we find Yudhiṣṭhira becoming increasingly pensive, as the obsequies were being performed for the final rest of the deceased. As the rites were taking place thoughts of merciless annihilation of the warriors, occupied the mind of Yudhiṣṭhira. Acquiring royal glory that way appeared barbarous to him too. Karṇa's career and its end were very pathetic. Thoughts of unfortunate happennings likewise harassed Yudhiṣṭhira. He, therefore, preferred forest retreat to reigning the empire.

We can clearly make out that the *Śāntiparva* too opens with *Viṣāda* like the *Bhagavadgītā* with Yudhiṣṭhira surrounded by sorrow.

Nārada, Vyāsa and a few other sages, who came to congratulate Yudhiṣṭhira, found him in need of consolation.

They pointed out that the war with all its concomitants was unavoidable on earth. He, who fought shy of it, was unfit for life. The man of understanding braved it. A King was to subordinate his personal griefs and betake to the discharge of his public duty. He belonged to the people and not to himself.

Counsel to him clarified his understanding to some extent. Gradually he threw off the mantle of his sorrow.

Yudhiṣṭhira appealed to Vyāsa to enlighten him on the science of statecraft, but the sage put it to him that he was pre-occupied with the sacred pursuits and as such his knowledge of the secular was very limited. He added that Bhīṣma was one, well-versed in both the sacred and the secular knowledge, which he acquired from the eminent sources and that it was worthwhile for Yudhiṣṭhira to inherit them all before it was extinct.

Yudhiṣṭhira too did not want to ascend the bloodstained throne.

Bhīṣma consoled him saying that the wicked were rightly weeded out.

Yudhiṣṭhira's queries and Bhīṣma's enlightening replies cover major part of the *Śāntiparva* although some discordant interpolations are budded in these dialogues which incorporate both the secred and the secular knowledge under three heads, namely.

1. *Rājadharma*
2. *Āpaddharma*
3. *Mokṣadharma*

i.e. the instructions to the Model King, code of conduct and path of emancipation.

The thought unfolds itself through the kind of dialogue which occur in Vedic works especially Upaniṣads.

Sometimes the queries raised by Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā* are repeated in the similar language by Yudhiṣṭhira in the *Śāntiparva*. For instance, the problem of evil is raised by Arjuna in the verse:

atha kèna prayukto'yaṁ
pāpaṁ carati pūruṣaḥ /
anicchannapi vārṣṇeya
balādiva niyojitaḥ //

Yudhiṣṭhira in the same fashion asks in verse 12.152.1.

pāpasya yad adhiṣṭhānam
yataḥ pāpaṁ pravartate /
etad icchāmyahaṁ jñātuṁ
tattvena Bharatarṣabha //

Even the reply given though similar, is elaborately given by Bhīṣma. He says:

eko lobho mahābāho
lobhāt pāpaṁ pravartate /
lobhāt krodhaḥ prabhavati
lobhāt kāmaḥ pravartate //

12.152.2

Just as the *Bhagavadgītā* begins with *Viṣāda* and ends with *prasāda*, the *Śāntiparva* too commences with *Viṣāda* and discusses *prasāda* towards the end in 12.238.10-11.

citta-prasādena yatir
jahāti hi śubhāśubham /
prasannātmani sthitvā
sukhaṁ ānantyam aśnute //
lakṣanaṁ prasādasya
yathā suptaḥ sukhaṁ svapet /
nivāte yathā dīpo
dīpyamāno na kampate //

The words like *rahasya*, *śama* etc. picked up from the Upaniṣads are freely used. Vyāsa in the *Śāntiparva* 238-14 and 15 speaks to Śuka in the following verse and describes spiritual knowledge in the *Śāntiparva* as the quintessence of the Vedic learning and secret knowledge.

Rahasyaṁ sarvavedānām
anaitihyam anāgamam /
ātma-pratyayikaṁ śāstram
idaṁ putrānuśāsanam //

and

navanītam yathā dadhnaḥ
kāṣṭhādagnir yathaiva ca /
tathaiva viduṣām jñānaṁ
putra hetoḥ samuddhṛtam // 12.238.15

In 12.9.14 Yudhiṣṭhira describes his life as a prospective ascetic. The description appears to have been bodily lifted from the *Bhagavadgītā*

na śocanna prahṛṣyañca
tulyanindātmasanstutiḥ /
nirāśīr nirmamo bhūtvā
nirdvandvo niṣparigrahaḥ //

Arjuna, in the *Śāntiparva* urges Yudhiṣṭhira to act in the same manner as Śrī Kṛṣṇa urges Arjuna in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

klībasya hi kuto rājyam
dīrghasūtrasya vā punaḥ /

and refutes Yudhiṣṭhira's arguments just as Kṛṣṇa had earlier refuted his own arguments in favour of forest retreat.

yadi sanyāsataḥ siddhiṁ
rājan kaścid avāpnuyāt /

parvatāśca drumāścaiva
kṣipraṁ siddhiṁ avāpnuyuḥ // 12.10.24

tasmāt karmaiva kartavyaṁ
nāsti siddhir arkarmaṇām / 12.10.26

Conclusion :

Parallels in situation, resemblance in the manner of exposition of thought which clearly bears Upaniṣadic stamp and the contents which incorporate the sacred and the secular teachings are indicative of the following conclusion.

What the *Bhagavadgītā* expounds in condensed form, the *Śāntiparva* takes up with more ambitious and voluminous form. The *Śāntiparva* enlarges and expands and elaborates almost the same topics like *satya, tapas, puruṣārthas, tyāga, hiṁsā, ahiṁsā*, social institutions like *Varṇa, āśrama, karma*, political aspects like principles of polity, philosophical and religious concepts like *ātman Īśvara, kāla, udyama, bhāgya, yajña, jñāna, sāṁkhya, yoga* and *mokṣa*.

What the *Bhagavadgītā* presents in seven hundred verses, the *Śāntiparva* elaborates into a little over eleven thousand verses. Sometimes what is contained in the *Bhagavadgītā* in a thought form develops into an elaborate discussion in the *Śāntiparva*.

Kṛṣṇa's advice to Arjuna to abide by the duty of a *kṣatriya* develops into instructions to a model king i.e. *Rājadharma* imparted by Bhīṣma to Yudhiṣṭhira in nearly six thousand verses.

Teachings on practical ethics develop into Bhīṣma's discourse on code of conduct *āpaddharma*. *Jñānayoga* of the *Bhagavadgītā* develops into *Mokṣadharma*. Of course, all this is done by introducing even discordant diversions.

One wonders whether the *Śāntiparva* is an extension or enlargement of thought content of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Perhaps after incorporating the teachings of Upaniṣads in condensed form, the same was enlarged in the form of the *Śāntiparva* by the author of the *Mahābhārata*.

If we accept the theory of multiple authorship put forward by some scholars, we shall have to presume that the author of the *Śāntiparva* must have been an ardent admirer of the *Bhīṣma Parva* in which the *Bhagavadgītā* figures.

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A NOTE ON ANUMĀNAKHAṆḌADŪṢAṆODḌHARA

By

VASANT PARIKH

A rare manuscript of *Anumānakhaṇḍadūṣaṇoddāra* or better known as *Anumānadūṣaṇḍdhāra*, by Narahari Upādhyāya, is preserved in the library of Oriental Institute, Baroda. It is primarily a commentary on *Tattavacintāmaṇi* a master piece monument of Navya-Nyāya, of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (13th cent. A.D.) of Mithilā. Though the trends of Navya-Nyāya can be found in the works of some of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholars like Udayana, *Tattavacintāmaṇi* has stolen the credit of being a magnum opus of Nvya-Nyāya, by its systematic and all comprehensive delienation. For, Gaṅgeśa "gave to this philosophy a new line of development and created for it a new field of work; and for practical purpose, he may be said to have been the father of that form of Nyāyaśāstra with which we are familiar today".[1]

Tattavacintāmaṇi, a treatise about 12000 Granthas in extent, is divided in four parts that are known as *Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa*, *Anumānakhaṇḍa*, *Upamānakhaṇḍa* and *Śabdakhaṇḍa* respectively. It, thus deals with all the four means of valid knowledge exhaustively. These four parts are again sub-diveded into forty six sections (12 + 17 + 01 + 16). With its methodology, precision and vigorous style this treatise as if overshadowed all the earlier Nyāya works for the time being and attracted the learned pundits, scholars, teachers and ardent students like a powerful magnet. A dictum, a section or sometimes even a single section of *Cintāmaṇi* became a concern for deep deliberation among the scholars who ultimately developed them into independent works. It was also natural that a huge bulk of commentaries and sub-commentaries on *Cintāmani* emerged in course of time. However the *Upamānakhaṇḍa* of *Cintāmaṇi* was generally ignored and except some scholars like Pragalbha, almost all the commentators did not touch it for various reasons. Out of the remaining three parts of *Cintāmaṇi*, *Anumānkhaṇḍa* was studied more. Hence the separate works or commentaries on this *Anumānakhaṇḍa* are abundent. It is interesting to note that though Vardhamāna—a renowned son and disciple of Gaṅgeśa has made a major and valuable contribution to establish a school of Naya-Nyāya through *Cintāmaṇi*, it is yet to be proved whether he

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[1] Gopinath Kaviraj. *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature.* Calcutta, 1961, p. 33.

himself has written a commentary on *Cintāmaṇi* ! His available commentaries are on classics of earlier Nyāya works such as *Nyāyasūtra* (ch. V) of Gotama, *Pariśuddhi, Nyāyapariśista, Kusumāñjali* and *Kiraṇāvalī* of Udyana etc. However in all these commentaries he has profusely quoted *Cintāmaṇi* and gave interpretations in the light of the thesis of his father.

It seems that the works of Vardhamāna have paved a way for the systematic studies of this new school of thought. It took sometime to percolate and flourish in the fertile brains of scholars. That is why we find the first flow of commentaries on *Cintāmaṇi* as late as the beginning of the 15th cent. A.D. Amidst this Galaxy of commentators, two great stars have shone out as if with a flash. They are Yajñapati Upādhyāya and Jayadeva, better known as Pakṣadhara Miśra. Both these Ācaryas of Mithitā have played a prominent role in the shaping of the future of Naya-Nyāya not only in Mithila but also in Bengal and subsequently in other parts of India.

Yajñapati Upādhyāya, more commonly referred to as simply Upādhyāya wrote a commentary named *Prabhā* on the three parts of Gaṅgeśa's *Cintāmaṇi*-viz. *Pratyakṣapramā, Anumānapramā* and *Śabdapramā.* The copies of this *Pramā* are extremely rare. A copy of *Anumānapramā* is preserved in the Darbhanga Raj library (foll. 125, 5 lines to a page).[2] In the begining of this commentary Yajñapati tells that he has studied under his father Śivapati. Śivapati was the son of a great scholar Voteśvara Upādhyāya, generally known as Darpaṇakāra of Mithila. This can be confirmed from the following statement of Narahari—the of Yajñapati, in his *Pratyakṣadūṣaṇoddhāra*—

तदापि नागृहीतेति । अत्र **वृद्धप्रतितामह**—वटेश्वरोपाध्यायचरणाः—
यत्र कल्पनीयकल्पनोपपत्तिः... ।

The date of the composition of this *Prabhā* is supposed to be between 1450 A.D. and 1460 A.D. Yajñapati's *Prabhā* became immensly popular and it was widely studied and was quoted often on in the later works. It 'quickly attained almost inconceivable heights in subtlety. Some of the views of Upādhyāya are now permenently embodied in the current texts'.

It is a strange fact of history, however that, in spite of such a genuine scholarship, Yajñapati was quoted most for criticism than for support. He is perhaps one of the few ill fated scholars whose views are first quoted at length and then are severally criticised !

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[2] For this and other useful information about Yajñapati, I have relied upon the *History of Navya Nyāya in Mithila*—Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, Darbhanga, 1958, pp. 158-164—A copy of the same comm. is also known to be preserved in the Asiatic Library of Calcutta.

The obvious reason for this harsh treatment against Yajñapati lies in the emergence of an another commentary named *Āloka* by none other than the great Pakṣadhara Miśra. Pakṣadhara is honoured as a great intellectual genious of Mithilā. He has also ommited to comment on *Upamānakhaṇḍa* of *Cintāmaṇi* in his *Āloka*. Many portions of *Āloka* have been published with some of the printed editions of *Cintāmaṇi*. But a complete edition of *Āloka* is yet remains to be edited and published. In the beginning of *Pratyakṣāloka*, Pakṣadhara clearly states that he has studied *Tattavacintāmaṇi* from his uncle Hari Miśra.[3]

However, according to the tradition prevailing in Mithilā and Bengal Pakṣadhara was a pupil of Yajñapati Upādhyāya.[4] Pakṣadhara also seems to support this tradition, as he refers to Yajñapati as his 'Guru'; while commenting on word यद्धर्मावच्छेदेन of *Cintāmaṇi* (*Anumāna, Upādhisiddhānta*),[5] in his *Anumānaloka*. Yajñāpati's son Narahari has fully elaborated this controversy in his *Anumānadūṣanoddhāra*. Padmanābha also clearly says in his *Pakṣadharoddhāra* that here Pakṣadhāra refers to the view of Yajñapati.[6]

It is simply interesting to note that Pakṣadhāra, though a pupil of Yajñapati never missed an opportunity to contradict the views of Yajñapati! He confronts on each step with Yajñapati. One wonders what led Pakṣadhara to part with Yajñapati! It seems both Yajñapati and Pakṣadhara were in good terms. They were also connected by a distant family relationship as shown by Prof. Bhattacharya.[7] Not only that but Yajñapati's own son Narahari also was a direct student of Pakṣadhara.

The only probable explanation of this anomaly can be traced to the fact that Pakṣadhara was the pupil of Yajñapati in the beginning. He might have read the *Pramā* of his teacher and taught it also to Narahari, the son of his teacher. But after sometimes he started to study under his uncle Harimiśra, where his inquisitive brain was ablazed with brilliant ideas. He began to see or to imagine faults in Yajñapati's *Prabhā*. He then started to write his monumental commentary—*Āloka* where he vehementaly attacked on the views of

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[3] अधीत्य जयदेवेन हरिमिश्रात् पितृव्यतः ।
तत्त्वचिन्तान्तामणेरित्थमालोकोऽयं प्रकाश्यते ॥

[4] Cf. also यज्ञपत्युपाध्यायच्छात्रः पक्षधरमिश्रश्चिन्तामणेरालोककारः ॥
—शब्दकल्पद्रुमः ['न्याय'—शब्दे]

[5] यथा च व्यंजनत्वेऽतिप्रसक्ति र्न दोषाय तथोक्तमा एवं सति तत्राति प्रसङ्गमाशक्यं तन्निरासप्रयासगौरवं च गुरुणां किमर्थमिति न जानीमः ।

[6] व्यञ्जनत्वेऽतिप्रसङ्गभङ्गाय यज्ञपत्युपाध्यायैर्यद्धर्मविच्छिन्न... etc. Poona Ms. fol. 54b

[7] His of N. N. p. 163

Yajñapati. He was a scholar with profound influence. He soon attracted his supporters. Many a scholar joined his fold. His style and "manner of arguing a point became the delight of all serious and hard scholars. The whole intelligentia, so to speak of Mithila and Bengal was divided into two rival groups.[8]" It is presumed that Yajñapati, was about 20 years senior to Pakṣadhara and the later wrote his *Āloka* probably between 1465-75 A.D.[9] It is difficult therefore to know if Yajñapati was aware of the *Āloka*, and if so, was physically competent to counter the arguments of his rivals. For, a number of scholars have criticized Yajñapati and joined hands with Pakṣadhara. For example Pragalbha in his *Anumāna-Pragalbhi* and Vāsudeva Sārvabhaum in his *Anumānamaṇiparīkṣā* have criticized Yajñapati's views on a number of points. Pakṣdhara being an eminent scholar, was fortunate to have a galaxy of brilliant students, like Narahari Vāsudeva, Sūcikāra Upādhyāya, Rucidatta and Bhagīratha. With the exception of Narahari, they all enjoyed the game of atracking Yajñapati.

At this crucial time, Narahari the son of Yajñapati rushed in support of his father. He wrote a commentary on the usual three parts of *Tattavacintāmaṇi* with the single purpose to defend the views of his father against those of his own Guru. He named his commentary as *dūṣanoddhāra*, implying that here all the faults of *Prabhā*, as imagined by Paksadhara are absolved. In fact they are not faults at all, but are absolutely valid interpretations. His subtle intellect shines out more brilliantly in *Anumānakhaṇḍa-dūṣaṅoddhāra*.

In this part he meticulosly examines the topic under discussion. In the beginning he faithfully records the original statement as given in the *Cintāmaṇi*. Then he relates the views of Yajñapati on that point in detail. After that he quotes the arguments of Pakṣdhara and sometimes of other opponents, against the views of Yajñapati. He also elaborates these arguments to give them full justice. Then he begins to show the fatilities of all these these objections aginst Yajñapati and reinstates the thesis of Yajñapati. In the end he gives his own contention, no doubt, in full agreement with Yajñapati.

Narahari while refuting the arguments of Pakṣadhara, never parts with modesty. He refers to his Guru, always with respect as अत्र गुरुचरणाः. It seems his aim is to defend his father than to attack his Guru. However he gives up this modesty while confronting with other opponents like Pragalbha and Vāsudeva Sārvabhaum, against whom he freely makes such comments as प्रलपितमेतद्, बालप्रलपितमेतत् etc. His attitude here become somewhat pungent.

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[8] Ibid p. 123, 125

[9] Ibid p. 125, 163

Narhari has thoroughly studied the classical works of Nyāya. His mastery of Navya Nyāya is self evident in the pages of *Anumānakhaṇḍadūsaṅoddhāra*. He has cited following scholars or works in this commentary—Udayanācārya, and his *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Gaṅgeśa, Cārvāku, Pragalbha, *Pratyakṣa Prabhā*, Maṇikaṇṭha, *Līlāvatīprakāśa*, Sārvabharma and *Siddhavalli*.

As Narahari has written this commentary with the sole object of defending his father against the adverse criticism of Pakṣadhara, he has mainly concentrated on those topics which reflect the controversy between those two rivals. Naturally therefore this cannot be regarded as an exhaustive commentary on *Cintāmaṇi*.

Besides his *dūṣaṇoadhdhāra* commentary, Narahari has also written a critical work on Smṛti, named Dvaitanirṇaya.

The date of Narahari can easily be fixed on the basis of the dates of his father Yajñapati and Guru Pakṣadhara. It is stated earlier that *Āloka* was written between 1465-75 A.D., and Narahari was the student of Pakṣadhāra, who was at least 20 years junior to Yajñapati whose date is proved to be somewhere between 1410-20 A.D. Narahari in his *Anumānakhaṇḍadūṣaṇoddhāra* has referred to Pragalbha and Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma who wrote their commentaries probably between 1460-80. All this leads us to conclude that the commentary *dūṣaṇoddhāra* was written after 1480 A.D. Again Rucidatta Miśra and Maheśa Ṭhakkura, both were the pupils of Pakṣadhara and both of them have criticised Narahari, in their works whose probable date is about 1505 A.D. Thus it can be presumed that *Anumānakhaṇḍadūsaṇoddhāra* was written somewhere between 1480-1500.

Though Narahari successfully defended his father against the criticism of Pakṣadhara, his was only a short term victory. For some of the pupils and suppolers of Pakṣadhara have aptly defended Pakṣadhara and vehemently criticised Narahari, Vāsudeva, the nephew and pupil of Pakṣadhara, Padmanābha Miśra, Rucidatta Miśra, Mādhava—son of Pakṣadhāra, Maheśa Thakkura and Madhusudan Thakkura are some of the scholars who have ruthlessly criticised Narahari and revived the school of Pakṣadhara. Narahari, it seems was a lone fighter to defend his father. However his genuine scholarship, logical sharpness and vigorous style have earned for him an honourable name in the history of Navya-Nyāya.

The Manuscript

The Ms. of *Anumânkhaṇḍadūṣaṅoddhâra* preserved in the library of the Oriental Institute, Baroda (Accession No. 12) is written in Devanāgari script and is incomplete. The last folio is not numbered. It contains 93 folios in all, though the serial numbers are from 1 to 133. Folios–2b, 4a, 9a and 132a are blank and Following folios are missing :—

Nos. 35, 55, 85 to 98 and 108 to 131.

The size of each folio is 9½″ × 3½″.

There are eight lines on each side of the folio and each line has 45 letters.

The whole Ms. does not seem to be written by one hand, but it is easily readable, though some of the folios are not in a good condition.

The Ms begins with—

पर्याप्तिरेकत्र कलत्रलाभे परत्र च क्षत्रकुले कलङ्कः ।
इति क्षणं धूर्जटिचापभङ्गे दोलायितो दाशरथिः पुनातु ॥

सुकृत्या पितृचरणानामधिगतसिद्धान्तसारेण ।
क्रियते श्रीनरहरिणा तातमते दूषणोद्धारः ॥

व्याप्तिविशिष्टेति । अत्र व्याप्तिविशिष्टश्च पक्षधर्मश्चेति न द्वन्द्वसमासः । प्रतिपाद्यधर्मिभेदे वा, अस्तु च तद्भेदे वा, तस्यानु शिष्टतयाऽसंभवप्रभानुमित्यव्याप्त्यापत्तेरिति तातचरणाः । तत्र तेषामयमाशयः । द्वन्द्वस्तावत्प्रतिपाद्यभेद एव साधीयान् । चार्थे द्वन्द्व [पा. २.२.३९] इति सूत्रेण चकारार्थभेदे प्रतिपाद्य एव तदनुशासनात् ।

From the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* it is known that two more Mss of this treatise are preserved as shown below :

(1) No. 6269 Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's Sarasvati Mahal Library Tanjore

(2) No. 4219 Lalchand Research Library, D. A. V. College *Lahore* (Now in Pakistan)

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF ŚABDAPRAMĀṆA

By

RABINDRA KUMAR PANDA*

All the major Indian philosophical schools recognise in aggregate eight means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*),[1] namely *pratyakṣa* (Perception), *Anumāna* (Inference), *Upamāna* (Analogy), *Śabda* (Verbal testimony), *Arthāpatti* (Postulation), *Anupalabdhi* (Non-existence), *Sambhava* (Probability), and *Aitihya* (Tradition). With various permutations and combinations of these means, different schools engage them in order to get the cognition of objects of knowledge. In other words, all the eight means are never used by any one school. For instance, *Śabda* (valid verbal testimony) is a means admitted only in five schools, viz., *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṁsā* and *Vedānta*. But all these schools are not unanimous about the nature and other aspects of *Śabdapramāṇa*. As a result a great diversity exists in their theoretical and methodological propensities. Consequently these four schools have put forward their independent theories of *Śabdapramāṇa*.

Accepting the fact that there are five different theories available to explain *Śabda* as a *pramāṇa* it would be interesting to examine analytically each one of them in order to get a wholistic perspective about it. But the scope of this paper is limited. The primary objective is to understand the subtle nuances of the epistemological underpinnings of the Nyāya theory of *Śabdapramāṇa*. Hence this paper attempts for a critical analysis of the theory of *Śabdapramāṇa* advocated by the Nyāya school of Akṣapāda Gautama.

Etymologically the term '*Śabda*' signifies sound (*dhvani*); literally it stands for 'word' (*pada*); and epistemologically it refers to a *pramāṇa*[2] i.e., an independent means of valid knowledge which is caused by the hearing or reading of a sentence. *Śabda*, as in the popular speech, being used in a technical sense by the Nyāya school does not denote a word.

Śābda and *Śabda* are not identical terms. The Nyāya school shows the distinction between *Sābda* (Verbal knowledge) and *Śabda* (Verbal testimony). Jwala Prasad explains : The former simply deals with the theory of language, and has to do with the significance of words irrespective of the truth or falsity of what they denote; while the latter is treated as a regular *pramāṇa* which is concerned with the validity of knowledge conveyed by words ".[3]

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Unlike the heterodox materialistic schools, viz., Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jaina and orthodox Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya school of Akṣapāda Gautama upholds the validity of *Śabda* as an independent means of knowledge and thus increases the number of *pramāṇa*s to four i.e. *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Upamāna*, and *Śabda*.[4] *Arthāpatti*, *Anupalabdhi*, *Sambhava* and *Aitihya* are not recognised as independent means of knowledge. They are said to be included into the above said four means; *Aitihya* is included in *Śabda* and *Arthāpatti*, *Sambhava* and *Anupalabdhi* (or *Abhāva*) in *Anumāna*.[5]

It has been argued that *Śabda* is identical with *Anumāna* and therefore cannot be an independent means of knowledge. For, the object indicated by *Śabda* is not perceived but inferred. As Inference gives the knowledge of an unperceived object through a perceived object, *Śabda* too enables one to acquire the knowledge of an unperceived object through that of a perceived word. In *Anumāna* as well as in *Śabda* one perceives to an unperceived object through perceived object. Just as in Inference there is a certain connection between a sign e.g. smoke, and the thing signified by it, e.g. fire, smilarly, there is connection between a word and the object signified by it in *Śabda*. *Śabda* does not, therefore, differ from *Anumāna*.[6]

This prima facie does not sound valid, says the Naiyāyika by arguing that there is a great difference between *Anumāna* and *Śabda*. The knowledge gained by *Śabda* is correct, not simply because it comes through the medium of words, but because it comes through words spoken by a reliable person (*āpta*). For instance, paradise, nymphs, seven islands are accepted as realities because they are spoken by reliable persons. Hence *Śabda* is not identical with *Anumāna*.[7]

Furthermore, though *Anumāna* and *Śabda* agree in conveying knowledge of an object through its sign, still, the sign in one is different from the sign in the other. In case of *Śabda* the special point is to decide whether the sign i.e. word comes from a reliable person or not. Moreover, the connection between a word and the object signified by it is conventional and not a natural one. A word, according to the *Nyāya School*, indicates a certain object, but it negates that the object is naturally or necessarily connected with word. Hearing for instance, the word 'cow' one thinks the animal signified by it. Nevertheless the word and the animal are not connected with each other by natural relation. In case of *Anumāna*, however, the relation between, a sign e.g. smoke, and the thing signified, e.g. fire, is natural and necessary. The relation involved in *Anumāna* is not, therefore, of the same kind as that involved in *Śabda*. In case of *Śabda* there is no perception of the relation. But the relation between a sign and the thing signified, which is the basis of *Anumāna*, is obvious to perception. For instance, the "hill is firy beause it is smoky" (*parvato vahnimān dhūmavatvāt*) is based on a certain connection between smoke and fire, which is actually perceived in a kitchen or elsewhere. The relation between a word and the object signified by it, which is the basis of *Śabda*, is not perceptible. The word *uttarakura*, for instance, signifies the country of that name, but the relation between the word and the country is not perceived, as the latter lies beyond perception.[8] Thus, the Nyāya school rejects the inclusion of *Śabda* in *Anumāna* and recognises *Śabda* as an independent means. To this effect Dasgupta holds: "The Nyāya system objects to the incorporation of *Śabda* (or *Upamāna*) within inference on the ground that since the mode of production of knowledge is different these are to be held as different *pramāṇas*."[9] Prof. Sastri puts the point clearly :—" The Naiyāyikas however, contend that, in cases where valid knowledge is derived from valid verbal testimony (*Pramāṇa Śabda*) one is not conscious of any conclusion through subsumption to a generalization; but one is, on the contrary, conscious of a valid verbal cognition or judgement (*Śābdabodha*) resulting from a knowledge of words without the mediacy of any such subsumptive process of thought. For this reason, the Nyāya system holds that *Śabda* deserves the rank of a distinct *pramāṇa*."[10] Thus, according to the Nyāya School, *Śabda* is an independent means.

Akṣapāda Gautama, the propounder of the Nyāya School, in his *Nyāya-sūtra* defines *Śabda* as the instruction of a reliable authority (*āptopadeśa*).[11] Vātsyāyana explains it further that the term '*āpta*' signifies a person who has immediate knowledge of the moral law (*dharma*), capability of perceiving objects in their real form and communicates valid knowledge to others out of compassion.[12] *Āpta*, according to Vātsyāyana, can be anyone—a *Ṛsi*, an *Ārya*, or even a *Mleccha*. There is no caste bar for performing the role of an *āpta*. Aruna Goel says : "It is evidently a very comprehensive definition of *Śabda*, and includes not only the scripture which is regarded as the word of God; but also the statements made by worldly persons who know the truth and communicate it correctly."[13]

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated author of the classic *Nyāyamañjarī* makes a technical analysis of the term, *upadeśa* and explains it further that *upadeśa* means *abhidhānakriyā*, i.e. that by which the knowledge of something is conveyed. It should not mean an instrument of knowledge though conventionally, the term *abhidhānakriyā* is the apprehension of the meaning of an audible sound implying an object.[14]

According to Jayanta, *āpta* means a person who is *vitarāga* (devoid of attachment) and efficient in the art of teaching. Since, to be an *āpta* is not an exclusive prerogative of anyone, anybody can be an *āpta* without any discrimination. But he should have perfect and profound knowledge of the subject of his teachings only.

Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya in his *magnum opus Tattvacintāmāṇi* defines *Śabda* as the means of knowledge which is the result of true knowledge of the meaning of words according to usage.[15] On this definition of Gaṅgeśa, Jwala Prasad remarks: He does not appear to draw any real distinction between verbal testimony in the sense of reliable authority and verbal knowledge in the sense of meaning conveyed by words.[16]

After Gaṅgeśa, the most acceptable and clear definition of *Śabdapramāṇa* is given by Keśava Miśra[17] which is not different from the *Tarkasaṅgrahakāra*, Annam Bhaṭṭa. According to them, *Śabdapramāṇa* is the sentence or statement of a reliable person who speaks rightly of the real object.[18] Thus, the Nyāya school develops the definition of *Śabdapramāṇa* and concludes it as the sentence of an authority.

The Nyāya philosophers have classified *Śabdapramāṇa* in two ways. According to Gautamı, *Śabdapramāṇa* is of two kinds,[19] namely, *dṛṣṭārtha* (that relating to perceptible objects) and *adṛṣṭārtha* (that relating to imperceptible objects). The former objects are found in this world, while the latter are not found in this world, such as, heaven, hell, transmigration etc. " The evidence given by witness in law courts, the knowledge about plants that we get from a reliable farmer, the scriptural injunctions about certain rites and ceremonies for rain fall, birth control and the like are illustrations of *dṛṣṭārthaśabda*. The second will include all the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, saints, prophets and the scriptures in so far as they bear on supersensible realities.

According to another classification, *Śabdapramāṇa* is of two kinds viz. *Vaidika* and *Avaidika* or *laukika* (secular). The former consists of the words of the God (*Īśvara*) i.e. the Veda since it is created by the God and is, therefore, valid on all points. The latter being the testimony of the human beings becomes valid if it proceeds from a trustworthy person[20] or *āpta*.

Since *Śabda* is said to be a sentence of a reliable person naturally question arises what a *Vākya* is? The Naiyāyika defines *Vākya* (sentence) as a combination of words (*Pada*s) having certain meanings.[21] However, any combination of words (*pada*s) cannot be a significant sentence. For instance, *Gauḥ, Aśvaḥ, Purusaḥ, hasti* is not a sentence. According to the Nyāya school, the construction of an intelligible sentence must conform to four conditions, viz., *ākaṅkṣā*, *yogyatā*, *sannidhi* and *tātparya*,[22] which are essentially required to make a sentence.

Unlike the Grammarians, the Naiyāyika defines *pada* (word) as the combination of letters having a peculiar power called *śakti* to denote particular meaning.[23] *Pada*s are of four kinds, viz., *Yaugika* (derivative), *Ruḍha* (conventional), *Yogaruḍha* (derivatively conventional) and *Yaugikaruḍha* (both derivative and conventional).[24]

A *pada* is called *Yaugika* if its meaning is solely determined by those of its component parts,[25] for example, the word, *dātā* (giver); it means one who gives (*dadāti iti*). *Ruḍha* is that if the meaning of a word is determined by the whole independently of the part-meanings, for example, the word '*gau*' does not mean the person who goes, but the cow.[26] *Yogaruḍha* is that if the meaning determined by the whole agrees with that determined by the parts,[27] for example, the word, *Paṅkaja* means a water lily which grows in the mud. *Yaugikaruḍha* is that when their meanings are determined either by the potency of the whole or by those of the parts, for example, the word *udbhida;* it means a germ or the sprouting of a seed or a sacrifice.[28]

According to the Nyāya system, a *pada* denotes the three, namely, the individual (*vyakti*), its form (*ākṛti*), and its genus (*jāti*) simultaneously.[29] The individual (*vyakti*) is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities.[30] The form (*ākṛti*) consists of the peculiar properties; it is configuration or a peculiar arrangement of parts, which is common to all individuals coming under the same genus.[31] The genus[32] (*jāti*) is the class, the general notion underlying the objects of a class. It helps a man to attain the comprehensive knowledge of things, similar to the individual in question. The import of a word is an individual as determined by a class and a form. The denotative power of a word refers to the individual as belonging to a particular class and as having particular attributes and form. As Matilal says : " .. words do not mean universals only, since these cannot be understood apart from the individuals and their particular forms. A genus can be recognised only through the individuals that constitute it and their peculiar configurations ".[33]

A word (*Pada*) being a group of letters having certain meaning, possesses a definite order of succession of letters. The constituent letters are perceived or heard one after the other, but the letters composing a word cannot mean anything by themselves. They bear meaning only when they are combined into one whole called '*pada*. Thus, the pada 'gau' means a particular kind of animal when the letters *g-a-u*, are heard or perceived and formed into the unity of one word.

The Nyāyā system holds the view of the unity of letters or the letters which compose a word cannot be simultaneously perceived. Only one thing is perceived in one instant. Hence the letters of a word are successively perceived. But in the order of succession when one is present, the others are either past or future. A synthesis of all of them happens by means of memory.

According to the Nyāya school, the different letters one after other are perceived and at the time of hearing of the last letter, the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of the preceding letters are retained in the mind. Hence the perception of the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters presents the word as a whole of many letters and its meaning is understood, according to convention

(*saṅketa*). Thus the word '*gau*' is perceived by the auditory sense organ all at once when it becomes related to the last letter and is aided by the impressions left by the preceding letters although they are past. The unity of letters is thus explained by the Naiyāyikas due to *smṛti* (memory) and association between the letters composing it.

The Nyāya school expounds the view that there is a relation (*vṛtti*) called *śakti* or *lakṣaṇa* between *pada* (word) and *padārtha* (meaning). It is conventional (*sāmayika* or *Sāṅketika*); not natural (*autpattika*) as the Mīmāṁsakas propagate. The relation, according to the Nyāya is created by *Īśvara* (God), not by human beings, The convention that such and such word should denote such, and such meaning is the creation of the God.[34] Following the will of the God *Pada*s denote their meanings.

This view has been advocated by the old school of the Nyāya with which the Navyanyāya school is not in agreement. The latter advocates that the relation called *Śakti* between a word and its meaning can be established also by the will of persons.[35]

Jagdīśa Bhaṭṭācārya in his classic *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* contends that when a relation between a word and its meaning is established by the will of God, it is called *śakti* or *abhidhā* and it is permanent. But when it is fixed up by the will of a person, it is called *paribhāṣa*.[36]

To prove the relation as conventional, the Nyāya school argues that '*gau*' which is an animal with two horns, four feet and one tail, is called by everyone by the name '*gau*.' But if by common consent one were to start calling it a *bovā*, the name would equally denote the same object. Hence the relation between a word and its meaning is to be accepted as conventional.

Apart from *saṅketa* or *abhidhā* the Nyāya school advocates another relation technically called *lakṣaṇā* (implication).[37] When a word refers to a thing which is not directly signified by the word but is related to the thing directly signified, the *vṛtti* or relation is called *lakṣaṇā*. When, for example, a person says that X is the pillar of the state, he does not refer to what is directly meant by the word 'pilar' but to something else related to pillar i.e. support. The stock example of the Indian literature is that a village of cowhords on the Ganges" (*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*). In this, the word 'on the Ganges' (*Gaṅgāyām*) does not really mean on the Ganges, but means 'on the bank of the Ganges.[38] This meaning is derived by the faculty of Implication (*lakṣaṇā*). It is significant to say that *Vyañjanā* which is accepted by Sāhityikas as another relation for the meaning of a sentence, has no place in the Nyāya philosophy.

A *Vākya* (sentence) being a combination of *padas* (words) conforms to certain conditions. Just as *Pada*s mean objects, so *Vākya*s mean the relations of objects, and bear certain meanings like constituent words. The Nyāya school propagates the theory for the meaning of a sentence known as *abhitānvayavāda.* It is the theory of the relation between the meaning of a sentence and those of its constituent words. According to this, the meaning of a sentence is merely the synthesis (*anvaya*) of the meanings of the separate words composing it. When a sentence is read or heard, first an understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after the other arises. Then the hearer by putting together the meanings of all the words, according to their expectancy, proximity, compatibility and intention (*ākāṅkṣā*, *sannidhi*, *yogyatā*, *tātparya*) arrives at the construed meaning of the whole sentence. The expression of the meanings of words proceeds the construction of a sentence i.e. there is a construction of the meanings as expressed in the words (*abhitānvaya*). The different meanings which are successfully expressed by the words are put together by means of memory. The meanings of the words are understood successfully; when one comes to the last word of a sentence he remembers the meanings of all the preceding words. The meaning of the last word being combined with those of the preceding words by means of memory gives the complete understanding of the meaning of the sentence as a whole.[39] Thus, the Nyāya school advocates the view that the meaning of a sentence is just the synthesis of the separate meanings of its words (*abhihitānvaya*).

Another theory of the meaning of a sentence has been set forth also by the Nyāya school, known as *tātparyavāda* (theory of intention of the speaker). Jayantabhaṭṭa in his classic *Nyāyamañjarī* expounds this theory.' *Tātparya*, according to Jayanta, is the power, on account of which the words (*Pada*s) convey their related meanings contained in a *vākya* (sentence). The *Pada*s by their primary power *abhidhā* denote their primary meaning. But on being used in a sentence, they have an additional power which continues to work until the meanings of the *pada*s are presented to our consciousness as being in relation with one another in a sentence. Quoting Kumārila, Jayanta explains that as stics of wood burn in order to perform their main task of cooking, similarly, words (*Pada*s) engage themselves in communicating the meaning of a sentence. Thus the Nyāya school explains the process of understanding a sentence.

In the *Śābdabodha* (understanding the meaning of a sentence), the knowledge of the words (*padajñāna*) is *karaṇa* (instrument), the knowledge of the meaning of the words (*padārthajñāna*) is *dvāra*, *Śābdabodha* is *phala* (result) and the knowledge of *śakti* (*śaktidhi*) is *sahakārikāraṇa.*'[40]

This is what the theory of *Śabdapramāṇa* (valid verbal testimony) propounded by the Nyāya school of Indian thought acknowledging an independent status of *Śabda* as a source of knowledge. *Śabda*, as we found from the analysis of the Nyāya view-points, is to be acepted as an independent source of knowledge provided its source—whether a person, irrespective caste, creed or colour, or a book, or a hearing or an instruction or any other thing, is reliable or valid. This factor ' reliability ' is the important aspect of *Śabdapramāṇa.* That is why the Naiyāyikas are in fact very right in accepting the reliable *Śabda,* not any ordinary *Śabda* as the source of knowledge. An ordinary *Śabda* spoken by a person who is not reliable can be source of knowledge but not the source of valid knowledge.

In comparision with other systems which do not accept *Śabda* as an independent means the *Nyāya* school seems very realistic and authentic in giving an independent status to *Śabda* as a means, for there are the objects which cannot be cognised by the means such as *pratyakṣa anumāna, upamāna* and others, but by means of *Śabda* alone, for instance, the *swarga* or the knowledge about plants that we get from a reliable farmer or the scripturnl injunctions about certain rites, or future life.

Thus, the Nyāya theory of *Śabda* is sound, systematic and realistic. Its epistemological significance as to be admitted.

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   वर्णितानि चत्वारि प्रमाणानि । एतेभ्योऽन्यन्न प्रमाणम् ,
   प्रमाणस्य सतोऽत्रैवान्तर्भावात् ।
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वाक्यं द्विविधम् । वैदिकं लौकिकं च । वैदिकमीश्वरोक्तत्वात्सर्वमेव प्रमाणम् ।
लौकिकं त्वाप्तोक्तं प्रमाणं ।

21. *Vākyam tvākāṇkṣāyogyatāsannidhimatām padānāṁ samuḥa*, Musalgaonkar, G. N. *op. cit.*, p. 185.

22 आसत्तिज्ञानं योग्यताज्ञानमाकाङ्क्षाज्ञानं तात्पर्यज्ञानं च शाब्दबोधे कारणम् ।
Shastri, Narayancharan and Shastri, Swetvaikunth, ed. *The Nyaya Siddhanta Muktawalee of* M. M. Shree 'Vishwanatha' Nyaya-Panchanan, (NSM.) Shree Krishna Vallabhacharya, Nageshwar Pathashala, Banares City, 1940, p. 339.

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26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

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30. *Ibid.* II. III. 69.

31. *Ibid.* II. II. 70.

32. *Ibid.* II. II. 71.

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37. NSM. *op. cit.*, p. 319.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *ibid.* p. 342.

40 पदज्ञानं तु करणं द्वारं तत्र पदार्थधीः ।
शाब्दबोधः फलं तत्र शक्तिधीः सहकारिणी ॥ *Ibid.* 291.

NĪLĀMBARĀCĀRYA'S LITTLEKNOWN COMMENTARY ON THE DEVĪMĀHĀTMYA *

By

MUKUND LALJI WADEKAR ‡

Introductory—

The *Devīmāhātmya* also known as the *Caṇḍī* or *Durgāsaptaśātī* has been traditionally handed down as an important integral part, forming 81 to 93 *adhyāya*s of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*.[1] This portion of the text, containing the glorification of the Great Goddess has obtained tremendous popularity among the religious aspirants and devotees of the Goddess. Just as the *Bhagavadgītā*, though forming a part of the *Mahābhārata* has a great value and importance as a separate treatise, similarly, the *Devīmāhātmya* also has a great importance and significance as an independent treatise for the worship of the Goddess. The *Bhagavadgītā* has 700 verses and hence saint Jñāneśvara describes it as a *saptaśātī*.[2] The commentators have tried to explain how the total verses of the *Devīmāhātmya* also known as *saptaśatī* can be rounded off to seven hundred. Like the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Devīmāhātmya* has been commented upon by numerous scholars. Prof. Thomas Coburn observes,[3] " The *Devīmāhātmya* has gathered around itself no fewer than sixty-seven commentaries ". Some of them have been published,

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[1] Banerjee K. M. : (ed.) *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1962 A.D. But the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, published by Venkateshwar Press, Saṁvat 1967, Śake 1832. Contains the *Devīmāhātmya* in *adhyāya*s 78-90. In this article, the *Durgāsaptaśatī* (with seven com.), Venkateshwar ed., Bombay, 1916 is followed.

[2] *Kī gītā he saptaśatī | Mantrapratipādya Bhagavatī |*
Mohamahiṣā muktī | ānandalī ase ||

Sakhare Nanamaharaj : *Sārtha Jñāneśvarī*, Bombay, eightth ed., 1941, adh. 18, verse, 78, ovi no. 1666.

[3] Thomas, B. Coburn : *Encountering The Goddess*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1991, P. S. also see p. 8 and 121.

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A great number of them is still in manuscript form.[4] Critically editing, publishing and a study of all such commentaries is a long-felt desideratum.

Nīlāmbarācārya's commentary—still unnoticed—

Nīlāmbarācārya is also one of such scholars – commentators, whose commentary on the *Devīmāhātmya* has not been much taken notice of by scholars. His commentary is not mentioned in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*[5] nor in the Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum*.[6] It is not referred to by Prof. Thomas Coburn in both of his books.[7] It is also not mentioned in the list of commentaries prepared by Dr. N. Y. Desai in her Ph.D. Thesis on the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*,[8] Nīlāmbarācārya is also not mentioned in the list presented by Prof. V. S. Agrawala at the end of his book on the *Devīmāhātmya*[9]. Thus, this commentary has hither to remained unknown and unnoticed. Hence an attempt is made here to throw some light upon this little-known and rare treatise and its Least-known commentator.

A Rare MS. of the Commentary in O.I.—

During the search for the manuscripts of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* and the *Devīmāhātmya*, the present researcher noticed a rare (and perhaps the only) manuscript of the commentary of Nīlāmbarācārya on the *Devīmāhātmya* in the Oriental Institute of Baroda (Accession No. 10826).[10] It is a complete manuscript, written in *Devanāgarī* script, containing twenty one folios. The *Granthasaṅkhyā* of this manuscript is about 500. It is copied on a paper of 25.5 cms. × 12.5 cms. size, written on both sides, with about 34 to 37 letters to a line and about 12 to 13 lines to a page or one side of the folio. The handwriting is quite clear and readable. No information of the scribe is available. Several marginal additions & corrections indicate the scribe's precision, fidelity and faithfulness. All *marginalia* are by *propria manu*. The use of red pigments is made for *lemmata* and colophons etc., while yellow pigment is used for correction & deletion. The end of each line is marked with two *daṇḍas*. There is a margin of about 2 5 cms on all sides, The *Recto* and *Verso* margins are marked with two red lines on folios 12-18. Only *Lemma* is found and nowhere does the commentary quote the entire verse or even the line of the work, commeted upon, namely, the *Devīmāhātmya*.

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[4] K. Kunjunni, Raja: *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, University of Madras, Madras, 1977, vol. 9, pp. 143-149.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Aufrecht, Theodor: *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Fraz Steiner Verlag GMBH, Wiesbaden Part I, 1962, pp. 261, Vol. II—p. 56, Vol. III, p. 206.

[7] Thomas, B. Coburn: (1) *Op. cit.* (2) *Devīmāhātmya—The Crystalization of the Goddess Tradition*, Motilal Banarasidass, First ed., Delhi, 1984.

[8] Desai, Nileshvari, Y.: *Ancient Indian Society, Religion and Mythology as Depicted in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, Faculty of Arts, M. S. University of Baroda, Baroda, 1968, Appendix 5, pp. 291-292.

[9] Agrawala, V. S.: *Devīmāhātmyam—The Glorification of the Great Goddess*, All-India Kashiraj Trust, Ramnagar, Varanasi, 1963, pp. 252-253.

[10] Nambiyar, Raghavan: *An Alphabetical List of Manuscripts in the Oriental Institute*, Oriental Institute, Baroda, vol. II, p. 786.

About Nīlāmbarācārya and His Commentary—

No biographical details are found anywhere in the commentary, in the absence of which it is also very difficult to surmise anything regarding his date etc. The N.C.C. refers[11] to two Nīlāmbarācāryas. One who is son of Saṅkarṣaṇa of Kāmarūpa, mentioning *Śaka* 1199 (i.e. 1277 A D.) in his commentary on the *Kātyāyana Śrāddhasūtra* and who is also the author of *Kālakaumudī* (dh. L. 2905); of commentary *Srāddhaprakāśikā* on the *Kātyāyana Srāddhasūtra* and of commentary on the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (RASB. V. 3523). He is quoted in the *Malamāsa-lakṣaṇa* chapter of the *Śuddhikaumudī* of Govindānanda (P. 275, B.I. ed. 1905). Another Nīlāmbarācārya, who is different from the above and probably the brother of Pīlāmbara Siddhāntavāgīśa (1550-1610 A.D.) is the author of the commentary *Nītiviveka* on the *Kātyāyana Srāddhasūtra* (first chapter of this commentary is called *Srāddhakāṇḍa*). Nīlāmbara was also the father of Gadādhara, the author of *Kālasāra*.[12] As no biographical information is available in the work under consideration, it is not possible for me to decide anything regarding the identity or otherwise of our author Nīlāmbarācārya with any of the above commentators.

However, with the help of the study of the commentary, we can make some inferences regarding the scholarship etc. of the author, based purely on the internal evidences. The name of the commentator is Nīlāmbara. The term *ācārya* may be a honorific appellation attached to his name. The colophons of the commentary have both kinds of readings—*ācārya* Nīlāmbara and Nīlāmbarācārya. He might be a teacher or a preceptor, having a good number of students attending his lectures. The present commentary itself may be some sort of notes, prepared and composed during the course of his teaching process. His knowledge of grammar is quite evident from several grammatical references and explanations, found in the text. He refers to and quotes from *Śruti*, *Upaniṣads*, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Purāṇas* (especially the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the *āścaryaparvan* i.e. the *Harivaṁśa*), the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, the *Yogasūtra of Patañjali*, the *Bṛhadyogayājñyavalkya smṛti*, *Varāhamihira*, the *Amarakośa*, the *Pāṇini's grammar* and the *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*. However, he nowhere refers to his near or remote predecessor—commentators by name. He simply refers to them by general terms like—*Kaścit*, *kecit*, *arvācīnāḥ* etc. But, he has only once referred to a *Gauda* way of interpretation by the remark—"*Gaudāstu*" (1.53)—thereby proclaiming his dissent about that interpretation. This remark may however suggest that he himself must not be belonging to the *Gauḍa* i.e. Bengal region. He has made very useful, witty and pithy remarks regarding the variants—like *ayaṁ bahusaṁmataḥ Pāṭhaḥ*, *Ayam anūcānasaṁmataḥ Pāṭhaḥ*, *Prathamānta-pakṣastu dūṣitaḥ*, *Bahupustakādarśanāt* at different places in the commentary.

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[11] *Op. cit.* 1978, vol. 10, p. 184.

[12] See Kane, P. V.: *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1975, vol. I, Part II pp. 1010 and 1191. He wrongly mentions him as the Son of Gadādhara. As per Kālasāra, Gadādhara was the son of Nīlāmbara. (See *Gadādharapaddhati-Kālasāra*-Introductory verses).

A Philosopher-Commentator—

The *Devīmāhātmya* has been commented upon by several scholars. The book with seven commentaries on it is quite well-known. It can be observed that most of these commentators give grammatical, liturgical, mysterious, esoteric and *tāntric* explanations of the text. But Nīlāmbarācārya is perhaps such a distinctive type of commentator, who gives mostly the purely philosophical (not mixing it with *tāntric* ideas) and grammatical explanations of the topics. He does not refer anywhere to liturgical or esoteric explanations. He seems to have philosophical background and hence begins his commentary with the vedantic bent of mind with obeisance to *Māyā*—

एका चितिर्जन्मविकारहीना
भूतेन्द्रियाख्याः सकलाः कलास्ताः ।
प्रगृह्य वेषं नटवद् विरेजे
मायेति तां प्राहुरमी नमस्ते ॥ १ ॥

while explaining the verse *Jñānamasti* etc. (1.34), he remarks that even an insect also has knowledge of the object, which is the substratum. If this knowledge which is there even in an insect were opposed to infatuation (*moha*), none would be infatuated. Then it would be contrary to the worldly experience. The conclusion would be that this worldly knowledge itself is opposed to infatuation (or *moha*). Hence how can there be a question of *Moha*. But it is not proper. The human beings are having knowledge. Similarly the animals, birds etc. also have knowledge of the objective world. He quotes the famous verse *āhāranidrā* etc. in which it is pointed that *āhāra* (eating), *nidrā* (sleeping), *bhaya* (fear) and *maithuna* (co-habitation)—these are common with the beasts, but knowledge alone is the distinctive feature of human beings. The knowledge here is nothing but the realization of the objective Reality and not the knowledge of the objective world. He concludes that worldly knowledge is not the real knowledge but the realization of the Objective Reality only is the real knowledge. He then quotes with respect the statements of Śaṅkarācārya from his commentary of the *Brahmasūtras*.[13] All the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are all having *avidyā* only at their substatum and the experience with the beasts etc. is also of similar nature. The tendency towards agreeable and turning away from the opposite is quite common between beasts and human beings.

Ultimately, he concedes that though some kind of knowledge is common among them, it is due to the effect of *Mahāmāyā* of Viṣṇu that they are not having discriminative knowledge of *ātmā* and *anātmā*, and they experience *moha* (infatuation). Later on, the commentator also quotes the *Sāṅkhyakārikā-rūpaiḥ saptabhiḥ* etc.,[14] while explaining the verses stating that she alone is the cause of bondage of *saṁsāra* and also the cause of final release (1 43)

While explaining the term *tāmasī*, occurring in the verse (1.68), he comments that it means sleep, and quotes the *Yogasūtra of Patañjali*[15] to elucidate how the sleep can be called *tāmasī*. He explains the term '*Mahāvratā*' (in 4.9) in accordance with the dictum of the *Yogasūtra*[16] only.

The commentator has explained the philosophical significance of the portion beginning from *yā Devī* etc. (5.12). He points out that the twenty-five *tattvas* (i.e. elements) are saluted in this portion, starting from *yā Devī* (5.12) upto

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[13] cf. com. on 1.39—
यथाचार्यपादवचनम्–' तस्माद्वि(दवि)द्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि ।
पश्वादिभिश्चाविशेषा(त्) 'इति । अनुकूले च प्रतिकूले प्रवृत्तनिवृत्ता उभयेषां तुल्ये ।

Cf. Narayan, Ram Acharya: *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya*, Nirnay Sagar Press, Third ed., Bombay, 1948, before 1.1.1, p. 3.

[14] Cf. com. on 1.44—
यथाहुः–" रूपैः सप्तभिरेवं बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च विशिनष्टि प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ "

Cf. Mainkar, T. G.: *Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, with com. of Gauḍapāda, Oriental Book Agency, second revised & enlarged ed., Poona, 1972, Kā. 63.

[15] Cf. com. on 1.68—
तामसी निद्रा । तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रम्-अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रेति ।

Cf. Kolhatkar, K. K. : *Bhāratīya Mānasaśāstra athavā Sārtha Savivaraṇa Pātañjala Yogadarśana* (in Marathi) Second ed., Bombay, Śake 1881, 1.10.

[16] Cf, com. on 4.9—
महद्व्रतं जातिदेशकालावच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मचर्याहिंसासत्यास्तेयापरिग्रहरूपं यस्याः सा महाव्रता ।

Cf. *Ibid.* 2,30-31.

Indriyāṇām adhiṣṭhātrī (5.33), while the *Ātman*, the twenty fifth element is bowed down to in the verse *Citirūpeṇa* etc. (5.34). Here some dispositions like *Kṣānti, Lajjā* etc. of *citta, manas* and *buddhi* are enumerated (not actually the twentyfour *tattvas*), but yet on the Vedic dictum of similarity of number, the twentyfour elements only should be understood to have been enumerated. Such cases are profusely found in the Vedic literature, where on the authority of similarity of number, something is emphasized in case of some other context. Or the author remarks that it should be understood to have some hidden, mystic significance. Thus in the first verse the *Mūlaprakṛti* (the Primordial cause) has been saluted and its offshoots by other verses. The triple mention of salutation is due to its being of triple nature i.e. *sāttvika, rājasa* and *tāmasa*. The Goddess is also of triple nature, when she is in the form of *citi* or *Jīvātman*. Hence there also salutation is for three times. But in the salutation to the *adhibhūta* form of the Paramātman, the triple salutation is not done in the verse *Indriyāṇām* etc. (5.33), as this form is free from the contact with the three qualities.

The commentator's adherance to the school of Śaṅkarācārya's *Advaita Vedānta* is further evident from his explanation of the verse ' *tvam Vaiṣṇavī*, etc. (11.4). She is also called *Māyā*, so that there may not be the contingency of the relinquishment of the non-dualistic nature of the Reality. In the form of *Māyā*, she has created delusion among beings. She has perturbed everything by the mutual superimposition of *ātman* and *anātman*. But yet there is no problem of contingency of non-release (*anirmokṣa*), because she alone, when pleased with the devotee, releases him from the bondage. Thus the commentary is interspersed with the philosophical discussions.

From the above deliberation, it is evident that the commentator Nīlāmbarācārya was a versatile scholar, possessing knowledge of the *Veda*, the *Upaniṣads, Bhagavadgītā, Mahābhārata, Purāṇas*, different systems of philosophy like *Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Pāṇini's grammar* and *Kośagranthas*.

Concluding Remarks :—

It would be clear from the above exposition that though small in size and short (but pithy and witty in explanations) the commentary is an important contribution to the commentorial literature on the *Devīmāhātmya*, having philosophical attitude in exposition. As the work has hitherto remained unnoticed and unknown, the present researcher has tried to throw some light on this littleknown commentary and its forgotten author. The project of editing and publication of the complete text has been undertaken by the present author, which would give more detailed idea of the contribution of the commentator.

INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

By

KASHINATH HOTA*

When we look into the derivative structure of the word *prāmaṇa*, we get its two forms: (i) the instrumental form (*pramīyate, jñāyate anena iti* ' by which something is rightly known ') and (ii) the *bhāva* form (*pramiṇoti iti* ' that which measures or reveals '). The former signifies the means of valid knowledge and the latter, the knowledge itself. Some of the Indian Philosophers have used *pramāṇa* in the sense of both: the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the valid knowledge (*pramā*). But, the Naiyāyikas have maintained it strictly in the sense of *pramāṇa*. Thus, according to them, *pramāṇa* is the instrumental cause (*karaṇa*) of a valid knowledge. As for example, the perceptual cognition involves certain factors like the sense-organ, the object and their contact etc. But, among those factors, the sense-organ alone is considered as the instrumental cause (IC) of the said cognition and that same IC stands here as the perception or the source of perceptual cognition. Similarly, the inferential knowledge (IK) has also got some factors for its production. The factors which are mainly involved with the inferential process are: (1) the knowledge of probans, (2) the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum (*vyāptijñāna*), and (3) the third confirmatory cognition or simply confirmatory cognition (*tṛtīyaliṅga parāmarśa* or *parāmarśa.*)

In this connection, the question arises, which of the afore-said factors is really the most efficient cause or the IC for the production of IK (*anumiti*). There is a difference of opinion among the Naiyāyikas on this issue. Some opine that the requisite purpose is served by the probans only. But, it is objected by other Naiyāyikas and they hold a view that it is the knowledge of invariable concomitance that can be considered as the IC. This thesis has also been rejected by the other group of Naiyāyikas and according to them, the confirmatory cognition is the IC of IK. The present paper is an attempt to discuss all the above factors which have been claimed as the IC of IK and at the same time, it also finds an appropriate answer to what exactly should be the IC.

The probans as the IC of IK has occurred in the Old Nyāya System. But, to substantiate this view, we do not come across many references in this system,

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Gautama, the founder of Nyāya Philosophy, is silent on this problem. While classifying the inference, he simply mentions that the inference is preceded by *tat*[1] that refers to the perception. Vātsyāyana known as *Bhāṣyakāra* of *Nyāya-sūtra*, interprets the said pronoun *tat* that stands for two things : (i) the perception of relation, i.e., *vyāpti* between the probans and the probandum, and (ii) the perception of probans.[2] He further clarifies that by the perception of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum, what is intended is the recollection of invariable concomitance. And, through this recollection and the perception of probans, the object which is beyond the reach of our perception is inferred.[3] From this, it is clear that Vātsyāyana is not in favour of the probans which can be taken into account as the IC.

After Vātsyāyana, most of the commentators of *Nyāyasūtra* have chosen different factors as the IC, which we shall discuss later. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as an Old-logician had two views on this problem. According to him, the knowledge of probans or simply the probans which is to be known, with the help of the recollection of invariable concomitance becomes a *prāmaṇa* or IC.[4] Here, it is not clearly known why does Jayanta give such option for accepting either of the factors as the IC, and we also do not find any positive argument, on the basis of which, he establishes the IC of a probans.

Dinakara Bhaṭṭa gives a complete idea of the views of the Old-Naiyāyikas on this issue. Explaining their thought he says that in IK, *liṅga-parāmarśa* is the *hetu*, but not mere *parāmarśa*. Needless to say that it is a qualified cognition in which *liṅga* is a qualifier and *parāmarśa* is a qualificand. When the qualifying part (i.e., the *parāmarśa*,) is known as the *hetu*, obviously its qualifier would also be the *hetu*. And, in such a case, we will have to accept both, the qualifier and the qualificand as the *hetu*, because, here, there is no conclusive argument which can go in favour of substantiating the invalidity of one out of the two[5]. Showing the causality of *parāmarśa* first, they had made an attempt to reject its instrumentality with the help of the definition of *Karaṇa*. *Karaṇa* has been defined by them as the specific cause that is associated with the intermediary function (*vyāpāra*) According to this definition, *parāmarśa* cannot be the IC since it is not associated with the intermediary function. *Parāmarśa* is a direct cause which requires no other factor like *vyāpāra* for the production of IK and hence, it is not a *karaṇa*. On the other hand, it is only the probans (*liṅga*, i.e., pervaded by the probandum) that, with the help of the intermediary function namely, *parāmarśa* results in the IK and hence, it (*liṅga*) is the IC.[6]

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[1] *Atha tat-pūrvakaṁ trividham anumānam. . .*, *Nyāyadarśanam*, ed. by Tārānātha Nyāyatarkatīrtha and Amarendra Tarkatīrtha, Munshiram Manoharlal 2nd edn., New Delhi, 1985, p. 132.

[2] *Tat-pūrvakam ity anena liṅga-liṅginoḥ sambandhadarśanaṁ liṅgadarśanaṁ cābhisambadhyate-Nyāyabhāṣya, Ibid.*, p. 142.

[3] *Liṇga-liṅginoḥ sambandhadvayor darśanena liṅgasmṛtir abhisambadhyate. Smṛtyā liṅgadarśanenā'pratyakṣo'rtho'numīyate, Ibid.*, p. 146.

[4] *Atrāpi liṅgaviṣayajñānaṁ, jñānaviṣayīkṛtaṁ vā liṅgaṁ pratibandha-smaraṇasahitaṃ pramāṇaṁ. Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. by K. S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute. Mysore, 1969, Vol. I, p. 282.

Viśvanātha repudiates the said thesis propounded by the Old School. He contends that the probans which is to be known, cannot be the IC. If we accept probans as mere *Karaṇa*, then in the case of past or future probans which is not known now, there will be no IK of a probandum in past or future.[7] And as its consequence no following cases : one would be able to infer fire on the basis of smoke in the (i) *iyaṁ yajñaśālā vahnimatī bhaviṣyati bhāvidhūmāti* 'this sacrificial altar will be with the fire, because it possesses the future smoke', and (ii) *iyaṁ yajñaśālā vahnimatyāsīt bhūtadhūmāt* 'this sacrificial altar was with fire, because it is with the past smoke'. Moreover, IK is produced only when there is a knowledge of probans. So, since the probans in past or in future does not exist now, there won't arise any knowledge of inference in past or in future on the basis of such probans.[8]

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[5] *Anumitau parāmarśamātram na hetuḥ, api tu liṅgaparāmarśaḥ. Tathā ca viśiṣṭasya kāraṇatāgrahe viśeṣaṇasyā' pi kāraṇatāgrahāt parāmṛṣyamāṇaliṅgasya liṅgaparāmarśasya vā hetutety atra vinigamanāvirahād ubhayor hetutāsiddhau ...*, *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, ed. by Hariram Shukla Shastri, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Samsthan, Varanasi, 4th edn., 1989, p. 211.

[6] *Tatra ca vyāpārābhāvān na parāmarśasya karaṇatā, apitu liṅgasyaivetyāśayaḥ, Ibid.*

[7] *anumāyāṁ jñāyamānaṁ liṅgaṁ tu karaṇaṁ na hi / anāgatādiliṅgena na syad anumitis tadā // 67 //*

[8] The Old Naiyāyikas do not accept the IK which is caused by the probans of past or future. So the inexplicability of such IK caused by such probans, for them, is not corruptive but decorative.

vastutastu-prācīnair atītādiliṅgakā' anumitir nāṅgīkriyate, ato' tītādiliṅgakānumity anutpattis teṣām bhūṣaṇam eva na tu dūṣaṇam—Kiraṇāvalī, a commentary on *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī*, ed. by Narayan Caran Shastri and Svetavaikuntha Shastri, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi, 4th edn , 1990, p. 220.

Like Viśvanātha, some other logicians as Govardhana[9] etc. hold a view that in IK, the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is the IC and there, the confirmatory cognition (*parāmarśa*) is to be accounted for *vyāpāra*. The basic criterion for deciding an IC, according to them, is based on *vyāpāra*. In other words, IC is a specific cause that is to be accompanied by the *vyāpāra*[10] without which, IC can never be established. The term *vyāpāra* is defined as the factor (x) that, being produced by a factor (y), produces an effect (z).[11] This meaning also does fit to the *parāmarśa*, since it is produced by the knowledge of *vyāpti*, i.e., IC, and at the same time, it produces the effect, i.e., the IK. They have criticized the Naiyāyikas who hold *parāmarśa* as the IC, only because that is not possessed of any *vyāpāra*.

Uddyotakara for the first time introduced the concept of *parāmarśa* in the system of Nyāya Philosophy, and he also is the first Naiyāyika to claim it as the IC of IK. In a later stage, this has been followed by most of the Naiyāyikas, i.e., both, the old and the new. According to him, it is a final process after which the knowledge of inference is immediately produced. Let us illustrate the entire process of inference here. In the IK of fire from smoke, fire is the probandum (*sādhya*), smoke is the probans (*hetu*) and the mountain where we infer fire is the subject (*pakṣa*). (1) On perceiving smoke and fire in various places like kitchen etc., one comes to know the invariable relation or invariable concomitance between these two, and expresses the two concomitances as to where there is smoke, there is fire (i.e., *anvayavyāpti*) and where there is no fire, there is no smoke (i.e., *vyatirekavyāpti*). In this stage, the perception of probans is said to be the first perception of probans. (2) Keeping this cognition in mind, he sometimes perceives smoke in some other place like the mountain. This perceptual cognition which can be expressed as *dhūmaḥ parvate asti* 'smoke is on the mountain' or *dhūmavān parvataḥ* 'the mountain is with smoke.' is according to the neo-logicians, termed as *pakṣadharmatā*. It may be worth-noticing here that the smoke which is perceived for the first time on the mountain is not qualified by *vyāpti*. However, this perception of mere smoke on the mountain is said to be the second perception of probans. (3) After this perception, immediately when the past invariable concomitance is remembered, we again perceive smoke not simply as smoke but as the smoke which is invariably related to fire and does exist on the mountain. It is the final perception that, combining the last two perceptions of probans and the remembrance of *vyāpti*, gets a new form called *parāmarśa* or *liṅgaparāmarśa*. This *parāmarśa*, according to Uddyotakara, stands for inference or the *karaṇa* of IK.[12]

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[9] *Anumitau vyāptijñānaṁ karaṇaṁ parāmarśo vyāpāro' numitiḥ phalaṁ kāryam ity arthaḥ—Nyāyabodhinī*, a Commentatry on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, ed. by Y. V. Athalye, BORI, Poona, 2nd edn., 1988, p. 35.

[10] *Vyāpāravad asādhāraṇaṁ kāraṇam karaṇam*, *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[11] *Vyāpāraś ca taj-janyatve sati taj-janya-janakaḥ*, *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśatarkālaṁkāra, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1974, p. 72.

While denying the other Naiyāyikas' claim regarding this IC, Uddotakara points out that the factors like the remembrance[13] of *vyāpti*, the perception of a probans and the perception of *vyāpti*, though are involved with the inferential process, still we choose *parāmarśa* alone as the IC. The reason for this, he explains, that *parāmarśa* is a prime cause and rest of the factors are secondary. Moreover, if we accept any of the said factors except the *parāmarśa* as the IC. there will arise a difficulty for accepting a number of *karaṇas* for one IK, which, for the Naiyāyikas, is not true. Finally, he emphasizes that by whatever factor the final object, i.e., *śeṣārtha* or *anumiti*, is produced, the same should be accounted for as the IC. On the same ground, he repudiates the remembrance (*smṛti*) because, even after the recollection of *vyāpti*, *śeṣārtha* is not produced immediately.[14]

The neo-logicians are mostly in favour of this opinion. They explain *karaṇa* as *phalāyogavyavacchinnaṁ kāraṇam*.[15] That means it is a cause that is not dissociated from its effect. Resorting to this definition, they deny *vyāpāra* as a necessary factor for establishing a *karaṇa*. So, without the involvement of *vyāpāra* when the IC enables to produce the result directly, we do not have any difficulty to hold *parāmarśa* as the IC, since it is capable of producing the IK directly.

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[12] *Tad idaṁ antimaṁ pratyakṣaṁ pūrvābhyāṁ pratyakṣābhyāṁ smṛtyā cānugṛhyamāṇaṁ parāmarśarūpam anumānaṁ bhavati*—*Nyāyavārttika*, Tarkatīrtha, *Op. cit* , p. 140.

[13] Some logicians (*ācāryadeśīyāḥ*) have established that inspite of the presence of all the factors, since IC is not produced without the remembrance (*smṛti*) of *Vyāpti*, it (*smṛti*) is to be taken here as the IC. *satsv apītareṣu smṛter abhāvād anumiter anutpādena smṛtir evānumānam*, *Nyāyavārttika—tātparyaṭīkā*, Tarkatīrtha, *Oo. cit.* p. 143.

[14] The word '*eke*' as we find in *Vārttika* i.e., *eke tāvad varṇayanti liṅgaliṅgisambandhasmṛtir anumānam*, stands for the followers of Ācārya, according to Vācaspati Miśra; Tarkatīrtha, *Op. cit.* p. 143.

[15] *Siddhāntacandrodaya*, a commentary on *Tarkasaṁgraha*, ed. by Jīvarama Shastri, Nirnaysagar Press, Bombay, 1957, p. 39.

Raghunātha holds a different view in this regard. According to him, mind is the IC of IK. Now, one may question in this connection that if mind becomes the IC, how can one distinguish a knowledge of perception from that of the inference, because mind is a common factor to both. To this, Raghunātha replies that though mind is a common factor in both the cases, still they differ from each other on the basis of their *sāmagrī*. That means the *sāmagrī* of a perceptual cognition is different from that of the IK. Thus, in the former case, *sāmagrī* consists of the factors like the sense-organ and its contact with the object, whereas in the latter, it is with the knowledge of probans, the knowledge of *vyāpti* and the knowledge of *parāmarśa*. He also clarifies that one should not have an impression that there would be no difference between the two *pramāṇas* namely, the perception and the inference since both the cognitions are caused by a sense-organ called mind. Because, when the actions or the results viz. *pratyakṣa-pramiti* and *anumiti* are different, naturally their *pramāṇas* or *karaṇas* will be different. And hence, there would be no confusion of inference with the perception, though mind is common to both.[16]

Conclusion :

To know the IC of IK, the Naiyāyikas have defined it in two ways : (i) *vyāpāravad asādharaṇam kāraṇam* and (ii) *phalāyogavyavacchinnam kāraṇam*. Former is an indirect cause and the latter, a direct. As per the first definition, it is the probans or the knowledge of probans or the knowledge of *vyāpii* that becomes the IC, but so far as the second is concerned, it is the *parāmarśa* alone.

The scope of accepting *liṅga* as the IC is very limited even in Old School. Starting from Vātsyāyana upto Udayana nobody had such idea on this problem. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa adopted this thought, but optionally. For him either the probans or the knowledge of probans becomes the IC.

The instrumentality of the knowledge of *vyāpti* has been mainly emphasized by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika system. When *vyāptijñāna* is the IC, according to them *parāmarśa* is the intermediary function.

Vātsyāyana though didn't use the term *parāmarśa*, yet whatever process he adopted for generating the IK, is not different from the concept of *parāmarśa*. From his statement—(*vyāpti-)smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena ca*. . ., what actually meant is the perception of probans (in the subject), that is qualified by *vyāpti*. This knowledge has also been explained as the knowledge of *parāmarśa*. So, on such basis, we may venture to conclude that *Vātsyāyana* also had an intention to hold *parāmarśa* as the IC. Uddyotakara develops Vātsyāyana's idea of *parāmarśa* and shows its systematic process from his stand-point. His notion of *parāmarśa* has been very largely accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

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[16] *Gādādharī* (*Dīdhiti*), ed. by Vāmācaraṇa Bhaṭṭācārya, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 42, Benaras, 1970, p. 1322.

When mind is a common factor of perceptual cognition as well as the IK and when these two cognitions are differentiated on the basis of some other ground like the *parāmarśa* or the sense-organ etc., how can one conclude in such a case that mind is a specific or efficient cause? If we accept this (mind as the IC), then at the same time, we cannot also ignore the instrumentality of soul, since it is also common to all the knowledges. So in order to avoid such contingency it would be rather better to choose some other factor for the purpose.

As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to decide which of the factors should be the IC, because all the factors involved in this process are equally valid or important for the resultant cognition viz.IK. If we neglect either of the factors, IK would be impossible. At this juncture, we may remember Jayanta Bhaṭṭ's concept of *pramāṇa*, where he claims that the collection of all factors (*sāmagrī*) that are involved in producing the result, is the *pramāṇa* or the IC. According to him, the instrumentality cannot be shifted to any other individual factor.[17] On this ground we may conclude that the collection of factors involved in inferential process, is to be considered as the instrument of *anumiti*. And in that case, we may not be wrong if we do not superimpose the instrumentality in any of the individual factors like *liṅga*, *parāmarśa manas* etc.

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[17] Varadācārya, *Op. cit.* 31.

લેખકોને :

૧ પાનની એક જ બાજુએ, ટાઈપ કરેલા અને એ શક્ય ન હોય તો શાહીથી સુવાચ્ય અક્ષરે લખેલા લેખો મોકલવા. ટાઈપ નકલમાં ટાઈપકામની ભૂલોને સુધાર્યા પછી જ લેખ મોકલવો. ગુજરાત વિદ્યાપીઠના જોડણીકોશ પ્રમાણે જોડણી રાખવી આવશ્યક છે. લેખની મૂળ પ્રત જ મોકલવી. લેખની કાર્બન નકલ મોકલો ત્યારે તે અંગેનું સ્પષ્ટ કારણ જણાવવું.

૨ લેખમાં અવતરણો, અન્ય વિદ્વાનોનાં મંતવ્યો ટાંકવામાં આવે તો તે અંગેનો સંદર્ભ પૂરેપૂરી વિગત સાથે આપવો અનિવાર્ય છે. પાદટીપમાં એ સંદર્ભની વિગત આપતાં લેખક અથવા સંપાદક/સંશોધક (અટક પહેલી), ગ્રંથ, પ્રકાશક, પ્રકાશનવર્ષ, આવૃત્તિ પૃષ્ઠ, એ ક્રમ જાળવવો જરૂરી છે.

૩ ‘ સ્વાધ્યાય ’માં છપાયેલ સર્વ લેખોનો કોપીરાઈટ મહારાજા સયાજીરાવ યુનિવર્સિટી, વડોદરા હસ્તક છે. લેખકે અથવા અન્ય કોઈએ લેખમાંનો કોઈ અંશ લેખિત પરવાનગી વગર પુનર્મુદ્રિત કરવો નહીં.

૪ સંક્ષેપશબ્દો પ્રયોજતા પહેલાં એ શબ્દો અન્ય સ્થાને પૂરેપૂરા પ્રયોજેલા હોવા જોઈએ.

૫ પાદટીપોનો ક્રમ સળંગ રાખો જે તે પૃષ્ઠ ઉપર તે તે પાદટીપોનો નિર્દેશ જરૂરી છે.

સ્વાધ્યાય

સ્વાધ્યાય અને સંશોધનનું ત્રૈમાસિક

સંપાદક : **રામકૃષ્ણ તુ વ્યાસ**

વર્ષમાં ચાર અંક બહાર પડે છે—દીપોત્સવી અંક, વસંતપંચમી અંક, અક્ષયતૃતીયા અંક અને જન્માષ્ટમી અંક.

લવાજમ :

—ભારતમાં...રૂા. ૨૦=૦૦ પૈ. (ટપાલખર્ચ સાથે)
—પરદેશમાં...યુનાઈટેડ સ્ટેટ્સ ઑફ અમેરિકા માટે...૬ ડૉલર (ટપાલખર્ચ સાથે)
—યુરોપ અને અન્ય દેશો માટે...પૌં. ૨.૫૦ (ટપાલખર્ચ સાથે)

આખા વર્ષના ગ્રાહકો લવાજમના વર્ષની શરૂઆતથી જ નોંધવામાં આવે છે. લવાજમ અગાઉથી સ્વીકારવામાં આવે છે. લવાજમ મોકલતી વખતે કયા ગ્રંથ માટે લવાજમ મોકલ્યું છે તે સ્પષ્ટ જણાવવું. લવાજમવર્ષ નવેમ્બરથી ઑક્ટોબર સુધીનું ગણાય છે, જે આ સરનામે મોકલવું—**નિયામકશ્રી, પ્રાચ્યવિદ્યા મન્દિર, મહારાજા સયાજીરાવ વિશ્વવિદ્યાલય, રાજમહેલ દરવાજા પાસે, રાજમહેલ રોડ, વડોદરા–૩૯૦ ૦૦૧.**

જાહેરાતો :

આ ત્રૈમાસિકમાં જાહેરાતો આપવા માટે લખો—

સંપાદક, ‘ સ્વાધ્યાય ’, પ્રાચ્યવિદ્યા મંદિર, રાજમહેલ દરવાજા પાસે, રાજમહેલ રોડ,
વડોદરા–૩૯૦ ૦૦૧.

THE ETYMOLOGY OF VĀHIGURŪ

By

SUBHASH C. KAK *

Vāhigurū is one of the names of God in Sikhism. " *Vāhigurū jī kā Khālsā, Vāhigurū jī kī fateh* " is the correct form of greeting for Sikhs and it occurs in the *amrit-sanskār*, the initiation rite, as well as *ardās*, the Sikh prayer. The word *Vāhigurū* is not to be found in the compositions of Gurū Nānak. The adjective *vāhi* occurs in AG 515 by Gurū Amar Dās, but in the sense praise. Vāhigurū itself as a name of God appears first in a composition by the bards in the court of Gurū Arjan (AG 1402, 1404). It was in the same period that Bhai Gurdās called Vāhigurū as the Gurū's *mantra* (Var 13, pauri 2).

There are several theories current about the meaning of this world. According to Cole[1] *Vāhi* is an acronym for Viṣṇu, Allah, and Hari. The improbability of this is clear from the fact that Viṣṇu and Hari mean the same and there is no logic behind such a duplication. Further there is no tradition of coining such acronyms in the Indian tradition. According to another popular interpretation this is " a composite term expressing total surrender to the Gurū (the visible form of God), but because it is typically uttered while one is in the presence of God, it has come to be applied to God himself. From the earliest days of the *Panth*, the experience of religious fervour has prompted Sikhs to repeat Gurū, Gurū, to cry Vāh! Vāh!, or to join the two and say Vāhigurū Vāhigurū! "[2] This etymology plays on the Panjabi word *vāh*, denoting praise but this analysis, which is based on the use of this word earlier by Gurū Amar Dās, does not appear convincing either.

But in one sense this second construction is not too far off the mark. The Panjabi *vāh* is derived from the Sanskrit *svāhā*, meaning " hail! ". *Svāhā* itself has been derived from the root *ah*, meaning say. It is also the name of the consort of Agni. **Svāhāguru* then is a construction akin to Rādheśyāma or Sītārāma. **Svāhāguru* thus respresents Guru and the corresponding *Śakti* in a fashion consistent with that of the other contemporaneous *bhakti* traditions of India.

Notes

1. Owen Cole, W. *Sikhism and its Indian Context*, London (1984).
2. Singh, Teja *Asa di Vār da bhāv prakāśani ṭīkā*, Amritsar (1952); the translation is from W. H. McLeod, *Textual Sources for the Study of Sikhism*, Totowa (1984).

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શ્રી સયાજી સાહિત્યમાળા

		રૂા. પૈ.
૩૩૩	**કૈલાસ**—સ્વામી પ્રણવતીર્થજી	૧૩=૦૦
૩૩૪	**અંબિકા, કોટેશ્વર અને કુંભારિયા**—(સ્વ.) શ્રી. કનૈયાલાલ ભા. દવે	૫=૫૦
૩૩૫	**ઐતિહાસિક લેખસંગ્રહ**—(સ્વ.) શ્રી પંડિત લાલચંદ ભ. ગાંધી	૧૮=૦૦
૩૩૬	**હરિભદ્રસૂરિ**—પ્રો. હીરાલાલ ર. કાપડિયા	૧૧=૦૦
૩૩૮	**ભવાઈના વેશની વાર્તાઓ**—(સ્વ.) શ્રી. ભરતરામ ભા. મહેતા	૩=૦૦
૩૩૯	**શ્રીમદ્ ભાગવત (ગુજરાતી અનુવાદ): ભાગ ૧, સ્કંધ ૧-૩**— (સ્વ.) શ્રી નાગરદાસ અમરજી પંડ્યા (૧૯૬૫)	૮=૦૦
૩૪૦	**ગુજરાત સ્થળનામ સંસદ વ્યાખ્યાનમાલા, ભાગ ૧ (૧૯૬૫)**	૯=૦૦
૩૪૨	**કુદરતની રીતે વધુ આરોગ્ય**—શ્રી. શાંતિલાલ પ્ર. પુરોહિત (૧૯૬૭)	૭=૫૦
૩૪૩	**ભારત-રત્ન**—શ્રી. ઉપેન્દ્રરાય જ. સાંડેસરા (૧૯૬૭)	૧૫=૫૦
૩૪૪	**મહાગુજરાતના મુસલમાનો, ભાગ ૧-૨**—શ્રી કરીમ મહંમદ માસ્તર	૧૭=૦૦
૩૪૬	**પેટ્રોલિયમ**—શ્રી પદ્મકાન્ત ર. શાહ (૧૯૭૦)	૧૩=૦૦
૩૪૭	**પંચદશી તાત્પર્ય**—સ્વામી પ્રણવતીર્થજી (૧૯૭૧)	૬=૦૦
૩૪૮	**અખો અને મધ્યકાલીન સંતપરંપરા**—(સ્વ.) ડૉ. યો. જ. ત્રિપાઠી	૧૪=૫૦
૩૪૯	**શ્રીમદ્ ભાગવત: ભાગ ૨**—(સ્વ.) નાગરદાસ અ. પંડ્યા (૧૯૭૨)	૧૧=૫૦
૩૫૦	**ચરકનો સ્વાધ્યાય, ભાગ ૧**—(સ્વ.) ડૉ. બાપાલાલ ગ. વૈદ્ય (૧૯૭૩)	૨૬=૦૦
૩૫૧	**ગુજરાતનો પોટરી ઉદ્યોગ**—શ્રી. શાંતિલાલ પી. પુરોહિત (૧૯૭૫)	૮=૭૫
૩૫૨	**ઊંડાણનો તાગ**—શ્રી છોટુભાઈ સુથાર (૧૯૭૫)	૧૫=૦૦
૩૫૩	**ભારતીય વીણા**—(સ્વ.) પ્રો. રસિકલાલ એમ. પંડ્યા (૧૯૭૮)	૩૧=૦૦
૩૫૪	**ચરકનો સ્વાધ્યાય, ભાગ ૨**—(સ્વ.) ડૉ. બાપાલાલ ગ. વૈદ્ય (૧૯૭૯)	૯૬=૦૦
૩૫૫	**ચાંપાનેર: એક અધ્યયન**—ડૉ. રમણલાલ ના. મહેતા (૧૯૮૦)	૩૬=૦૦
૩૫૬	**દ્વારકાના પ્રદેશનો સાંસ્કૃતિક ઇતિહાસ**—(સ્વ.) શ્રી ક. ન. જોષી	૪૪=૦૦
૩૫૭	**આધુનિક ગુજરાતના સંતો, ભાગ ૨**—ડૉ. કેશવલાલ ઠક્કર (૧૯૭૯)	૪૫=૦૦
૩૫૮	**સૂર્યશક્તિ**—શ્રી. પદ્મકાન્ત ર. શાહ (૧૯૮૧)	૫૨=૫૦
૩૫૯	**કવિ ગિરધર: જીવન અને કવન**—ડૉ. દેવદત્ત જોશી	૫૧=૦૦
૩૬૦	**વનૌષધિકોશ**—પ્રો. કે. કા. શાસ્ત્રી	૩૫=૭૫
૩૬૧	**સહસ્રલિંગ અને રુદ્રમહાલય**—(સ્વ.) શ્રી કનૈયાલાલ ભા. દવે	૭૯=૦૦
૩૬૨	**વૈષ્ણવતીર્થ ડાકોર**—(સ્વ.) ડૉ. મંજુલાલ ર. મજમુંદાર	૪૮=૦૦
૩૬૧	**બૃહત્રયી અને લઘુત્રયી**—(સ્વ.) ડૉ. બાપાલાલ ગ. વૈદ્ય	૩૩=૦૦
૩૬૩	**વડોદરા એક અધ્યયન**—ડૉ. આર. એન. મહેતા	૪૪=૦૦
૩૬૪	**મહારાજા સયાજીરાવ ત્રીજા**—(સ્વ.) પ્રો. હસિત બૂચ	૪૯=૦૦
૩૬૫	**નાભાજીકૃત ભક્તમાલના ઐતિહાસિક ભક્તો-એક અધ્યયન**— શ્રી મૂળશંકર હિ. કેવલીયા	૪૪=૦૦
૩૬૬	**લેસર**—શ્રી. પદ્મકાન્ત ર. શાહ	૪૮=૦૦
૩૧૭	**આહારવિજ્ઞાન**—(પુનઃ મુદ્રણ) ડૉ. જયશંકર ધ. પાઠક અને (સ્વ.) અનંતરાય મ. રાવળ (૧૯૯૧)	૬૦=૦૦

પ્રાપ્તિસ્થાન: **યુનિવર્સિટી પુસ્તકવેચાણ વિભાગ,**
જનરલ એજ્યુકેશન સેન્ટર, પ્રતાપગંજ, વડોદરા-૩૯૦ ૦૦૨.

SETTLEMENT OF A BOUNDARY OF A VILLAGE, A FIELD AND A HOUSE IN ANCIENT INDIA

By

JAYA CHEMBURKAR*

*1 Judicial system has always been indispensable for a man ever since the days of a Tribal Society. Maintenance of law and order, punishing the criminals and giving of justice to the subject have been the primary duties of a leader of a tribe in a tribal society, and the ruler in a civilised urban society. Dharmaśāstra works viz . the Dharmasūtras, Sruṛtis, and Digests give us an idea about the ancient Judiciary. The Digests have synthesised the views of the different Smṛtitis. One of such digests is the *Smṛticandrikā*, the work of Devanabhaṭṭa written in 1150 A.D.-1225: AD. This paper proposes to take a review of *sīmāvāda* (dispute over the boundary of villages, fields and houses) discussed in the *Smṛticandrikā*.

*2 While discussing the topic of *sīmāvāda*, the different aspect of this issue viz. (1) The causes of land-dispute, (2) Types of boundaries, (3) Boundary marks, (4) Settlement of border-dispute, (5) Qualifications of witnesses, (6) Procedure of settling the boundary dispute, (7) Punishment for false evidence etc., have been discussed in the *Smṛticandrikā*. Let us examine them.

(1) Causes of Land-Dispute.

*3 There are six causes of land-dispute according to Kātyāyana. They are (1) claiming more land, (2) claim that the person is entitled to less than he possesses, (3) claim to a share, (4) denial of a share, (5) seizing possession when previously there was none, (6) boundary dispute. In all these cases, boundaries have directly or indirectly to be settled and, therefore, all these are included under the topic *Sīmāvāda* as Dr. Kane observes.

(2) Types of Boundaries

*4 The *Smṛticandrikā* mentions different boundaries described by Vyāsa and Nārada. According to Vyāsa, there are three kinds of boundaries, (1) *dhvajinī*, (2) *mātsyinī* (3) *naidhānī*, whereas according to Nārada, there are five types of boundaries. Nārada describes two move in addition to the obove three boundaries; they are viz. (1) *bhayavarjitā*, (2) *rājaśāsananītā*. The tall trees

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planted to indicate the boundary look like a staff of a flag, therefore, a boundary with tall trees is described as *dhvajinī*[1]. When on the boundary a river replete with fish and tortoise is flowing, such a boundary is known as *matsyinī*.[2] A *naidhānī* boundary is formed by the concealed signs such as a pot containing chaff, cinders, bones, potsherds etc.[3] The *bhayavarjitā* boundary is so called because it is free from danger, since it is settled by the agreement of the parties; and the *rājaśāsamanītā* is so called because it is laid down by the order of the king when there are neither witness nor the marks of the boundary.[4]

*5 The *Smṛticandrikā* states that the visible signs are self-evident or they can be proved with effort or they can be made known to young persons by the elderly persons. The *Smṛticandrikā* corroborates its view by quoting Bṛhaspati who remarks,—" Senior people should show the boundaries to the young people and when the young grow old, they should show them to their children. In this way, owing to the uninterrupted tradition of knowers (of the boundary), even after a lapse of time, there will be no confusion regarding the boundary ".[5]

(3) Boundary Marks

*6 According to the *Smṛticandrikā*, the boundary of a village should be marked while founding a village, or at the time of entering a village; and the boundary should be indicated by a wall of big stones, accompanied by other visible and concealed marks.[6] The visible marks are a lake, a well, a temple, a garden, a course of a river and various trees and plants like reeds and bushes.[7] Kullūka, the commentator of the *Manusmṛti* states that all men desiring to fetch water and to visit the deity in the temple are constantly on the spot and hence the boundary line becomes well known to them. Such people are the witnesses of the boundary. Dry-cowdung, bones chaff, cinders (pieces of wood half-burnt), pebbles potsherds, sand, bricks, cow's hair, seeds of cotton, ashes put in a jar and buried on the junctions of the boundaries are the concealed marks of a boundary.[8] The visible marks can be easily obliterated; the lakes and wells might be filled up; the trees might die or could be cut down and so on. Therefore, in addition to the visible marks, concealed marks of a boundary have been prescribed by the Smṛti Writers. These concealed marks do not corrode, the earth does not eat them up. Manu states that the hidden boundary marks are also necessary because in the world there are constant trespasses due to the ignorance of boundaries, among men.[9]

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[1] *grāmayorubhayossīmnī vrkṣā yatra samunnatāḥ |*
samucchritā dhvajākārādhvajinī sā prakīrtitā ||
Vyāsa quoted in the *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 536.

[2] *Svacchandagā bahujalā matsyakūrmasamanvita |*
nityapravāhinī yatra sīmā sā matsyinī matā ||
Vyāsa quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 536.

[3] *Smṛticandrikā* p. 536; also of Nārada quoted in the *Mitākṣarā* on Yāj. II. 150.

[4] *Mitākṣarā* on Yāj. II. 150, 151.

[5] *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 536.

[6] *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 534.

[7] Manu VIII. 246-248; Yāj. II. 154.

(4) Settlement of Border Disputes

*7 The boundary between the two contending villages was to be settled with the help of the obove mentioned marks. According to the *Smṛticandrikā*, if the contending party cannot be relied upon, the king should rely upon a witness. Manu also prescribes that, if, even on the inspection of the marks, there is a doubt, the settlement of the dispute regarding the boundaries shall entirely depend upon a witness.[10]

(5) Qualifications of Witnesses

*8 Qualifications of a witness have been described by Bṛhaspati. According to him the witnesses should know the *āgama* (i.e. acquisition, purchase etc. of the land which bestow ownership), *pramāṇa* (i.e. measurement), *bhoga* (i.e. enjoyment), of the land, time i.e. period of possession, name (of the possessor), and the geographical features of the land (*bhūbhāgalakṣaṇam*).[11]

*9 (6) Procedure of Settling the Boundary Dispute

The *Smṛticandrikā* states that in the absence of the witnesses possessed of the above qualifications, the king should decide the boundary in the light of the marks indicated by the *Sāmanta* i.e. the original inhabitants of the neighbouring village. Manu VIII. 258 and Kātyāyana[12] also hold the same view. When the original inhabitants of the neighbouring village are not honest or have a fault, Kātyāyana and Nārada advise a king to consult the experienced persons (*maula*) and elderly people in the village to decide the boundary.[13] Manu declares that in the absence of the *Sāmanta*s (original inhabitants of the neighbouring village) and the experienced persons, the frequenters of forests such as hunters fowlers, cowherds, fishermen, root-diggers, snake catchers, gleaners etc., who go about searching fruits, flowers, fuel and such things—be carefully examined.[14] Medhātithi commenting on Manu VIII. 260, remarks, ' these persons wander about in the forests, surrounding villages, without entering the villages and might know the exact boundaries. Passing by that way, they might have seen some persons cultivating the fields lying within the disputed area, and might have asked them –" what is this village, in which you are cultivating fields ". In this manner it is quite possible for them to have acquired the required experience '. This indicates that when there is absence of the sophisticated people, the king may rely on the unsophisticated people for their evidence.

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[8] Bṛhaspati quoted by Kullūka on Manu VIII. 250-251, Yāj. II. 151. cf. *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 535.

[9] Manu VIII. 249, 251.

[10] Manu VIII. 253.

[11] *āgamam ca pramāṇam ca bhogam kālam ca nāma ca |*
bhūbhāgalaṣaṇam caiva ye viduste'ttra sākṣiṇaḥ ||
Bṛhaspati quoted by *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 537.

[12] *Teṣāmabhāve Sāmantāḥ ||* Kātyāyana quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā*,

[13] *Smṛticandrikā* p. 538-539. also Manu VIII. 259.

p. 537.

*10 Only after taking an oath the *Sāmanta*s and other witnesses have to declare their decision regarding the boundary.[15] A *brāhmaṇa* should swear by truth, and a *kṣatriya* with his vehicles and weapons. Manu prescribes that the witnesses should be asked the boundary marks in the presence of the assembly of villages and the contending parties.[16] Commenting on this verse of Manu, Medhātithi remarks, " Though a village contains innumerable inhabitants, yet as a rule, only two men, one from each of the two villages become parties to a boundary-dispute; and it is in the presence of these two men, as also in that of an assembly of villagers i.e. a concourse of the inhabitants of the two villages,— that the witnesses should be questioned ". Or the meaning may be that when a few very old inhabitants of the neighbouring village have been called as witnesses, it is necessary that other inhabitants also of those villages should be present; since the latter would have heard of the exact boundaries from the older people, so that if examined in their presence, the witnesses would not lie ". On being questioned the witnesses should honestly declare the boundary and the king should record their evidence as well as the names of the witnesses according to Manu VIII. 255.

*11 While declaring the boundary, the witnesses are required to place earth upon their heads, wear red garlands and clothes and should swear by their respective meritorious deeds.[17] If the witnesses decide in the right manner, they being truthful witnesses, become purified; but if on reference to other proofs and to other more reliable witnesses, it is found that the witnesses have not deposed truthfully, each of them shall be fined two hundred *kārṣāpaṇas*.

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[14] Manu VIII. 259, 260.

[15] *Śapathaiśśāpitassvaisvaih bruyussimāvinirṇayam |*
darśayeyuśca lingāni tatpramâṇamiti ||
Bṛhaspati quoted by *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 541.

[16] Manu VIII. 254.

[17] Manu VIII. 256.

*12 Nārada holds that one person though confident (*pratyayavānapi*) should not lay down the boundary, because this work being important, it depends on many.[18] But Bṛhaspati holds a different opinion. According to him even a single person who is virtuous and who is acceptable to both the contending parties, wearing red garlands and clothes, placing earth upon his head, being truthful and fasting should indicate the boundary in the absence of more witnesses and in the absence of visible or concealed marks.[19] According to the *Smṛticandrikā* the decision of the witnesses becomes final only after half a month and not before that. The *Smṛticandrikā* quotes Kātyāyana to support this view. Kātyāyana declares that the decision made by the witnesses or neighbours becomes final only after the lapse of three weeks, if no calamity from the act of God or king befalls the witness.

*13 Nārada states that when there are no knowers of a boundary, nor the signs of a boundary, the king should lay down the boundary for the two contending parties, according to his will.[20] But Manu holds a different view. According to him in the event of the boundary being uncertain, a righteous king shall himself assign to them their lands, on the basis of advantages. Medhātithi remarks that the king shall indicate the boundary in such a manner as to make the decision equally advantageous to both the parties, so that if the field assigned to one party is less in size, it is of better quality, being more fertile.

*14 A dispute regarding the boundaries should be settled during the month of *Jyeṣṭha* (June), when the landmarks are distinctly visible and not covered by water or grass as in monsoon.[21] In this connection Medhātithi adds, " In cases where demarcation has been done by creepers and thickets, the boundary should be settled before the advent of spring; because when trees and creepers are burnt down by the forest fires during the spring, no distinction could be perceived. He further remarks that in case where the marks are easily visible, the king should not wait for any particular month, thereby affording time to the parties concerned. It is only for the purpose of finding the necessary marks, that one need wait for any particular month. This is the sole purpose served by the mention of the month of *Jyeṣṭha* " (June).

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[18] Nārada quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā*. p. 543.

[19] Bṛhaspati quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 543.

[20] *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 544.

[21] Manu VIII. 245.

*15 The *Smṛticandrikā* specifically mentions that in deciding the boundary, the king shold not make use of an ordeal.[22]

*16 If there is a controversy among the *sāmantas*, the king has been advised o rely on the written documents by the *Smṛticandrikā* on the authority of *Śaṅkha* and *Likhita* who maintain, 'If there is a controversy among the *Sāmantas*, the king should rely on the written documents; in case of a controversy among the written documents, he should rely on the elderly people, and guilds in the village or a town (as the case may be); if the elderly people etc. are not able to prove, the king should take into account possession (of the land) for ten years by the party.

*17 The *Smṛticandrikā* is of the opinion that whether the witnesses have given contrary evidence or not can be known within a fortnight from the manifestation of a calamity arising from an accident or a king.

(7) Punishment for False Evidence

*18 If all the witnesses do not give evidence out of fear or greed, each one should be made to pay the first amercement. If there is a difference in their statements, they should be made to pay the first amercement. If they tell lies all their belongings should be confiscated according to Viṣṇu.[23] According to Nārada and Manu VIII. 263, *Sāmantas* are to be punished separately with middle amercement for falsehood. Medhātithi commenting on Manu VIII. 263 remarks, "the holders of neighbouring fields are sure to know the right boundary, hence if they happen to give false evidence their punishment should be heavy. As for ordinary neighbours, it is not necessary that they should be congnisant of the exact boundaries of the fields".

Comments

*19 Different Smṛti writers enumerate different *Vyavahārpadas* (i.e topics of litigation or dispute). Kauṭilya, Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada, Bṛhaspati include the topic of boundary dispute in the list of *Vyavahārapadas*. Kauṭilya, Manu and Yajñavalkya refer to this topic as *sīmāvāda* i.e. boundary dispute. Nārada has used the term *kṣetrajavivāda* i.e. dispute arising (out of possession of) land. Bṛhaspati denotes this topic by the word *bhūvāda* i.e. dispute regarding land.[24] Inclusion of this topic in the *Vyavahārapadas* indicates its legal importance.

*20 In ancient India people mostly stayed in villages. A village was the smallest unit of administration. The head of a village was a *grāmaṇī* or a *gopa*.

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[22] *na divyena nirṇayaḥ* | *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 543.

[23] *kūṭasākṣiṇām sarvasvāpahāraḥ kāryaḥ iti* ||
Viṣṇusmṛti quoted by the *Smṛticandrikā*, p. 546.

[24] Kane, P. V.; *Hist. of D.S.*; Vol. III, p. 249.

The *grāmaṇī*, with the help of a village-council and the village elders managed the affairs of the village. In the Mauryan period villages used to settle the disputes between their residents.[25] The Jātakas also throw light on this. The policy of the ancient state was to invest a village with extensive powers,[26] and enforce the decisions taken by the village councils, and the different popular courts such as *kūla* (an informal body of family elders), śrenī (the court of guilds), *pūga*[27] (courts consisting of members belonging to different castes and professions, but staying in the same village or a town). The village council, the *grāmaṇī*, and the popular courts exercised executive and judicial powers on behalf of the king. The boundary dispute discussed above was settled by these local administrative and judicial bodies and not the king; though in the Smṛti rules about dispute, the king has been described as settling the border-dispute,[28] the word *rājā* is to be understood in the sense of an administrator or the representative of a king as a *grāmaṇī* or a *gopa* etc.

*21 It will be observed here that Kauṭilya treats this topic very briefly; he only lays down rules for the settlement of a boundary-dispute; he does not describe the marks of a boundary, types of boundaries, causes of a dispute etc. as the later Smṛti-writers have done. It may be stated here that in the post-Mauryan period the Sātavāhana rulers introduced the practice of donation lands and villages; this practice became very common in the later period.[29] Land was donated to learned brāhmaṇas, temples, monasteries and government officials for their service etc. Villages donated to the learned brahmaṇas, teachers were called *Agrahāra* villages. Such donations were made on certain conditions. If the donee or his descendants did not fulfil the conditions, the donated land was taken away from him and was transferred to another deserving donee. Donees or their descendants were allowed to exchange their lands. Such transfers and exchanges must have necessitated settling of the boundaries in the post-Mauryan period. Secondly, division of land and individual ownership of land must have given rise to border disputes in the later period. The law-givers of the later period had to take note of it and hence the writers from Manu onwards appear to have discussed this topic in detail. Probably in Kauṭilya's time this issue was not so serious and, therefore, Kauṭilya did not treat it elaborately.

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[25] *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya III. 10.

[26] Altekar, A. S; *State and Government in Ancient India*, p. 237.

[27] *nṛpeṇādhikṛtāḥ pūgāḥ śreṇayo'tha kulāni ca /*
pūrvam pūrvam guru jñeyam vyavahāravidhau nṛṇām // Yāj. II. 30

[28] Manu VIII. 261, 263, 265; Yāj. II. 153.

[29] Alterkar, A. S.; *State and Government in Ancient India;* p. 205.

*22 Concrete evidence in the form of visible and concealed marks was first examined. In the absence of these marks, witnesses and different sophisticated and unsophisticated people were to be consulted. The emphasis was on finding out the truth. No injustice was to be done to either party. Ancient jurisprudence insisted that the trial should be in public. So that when the witnesses see before them people known to them, they would not give false evidence. This principle was adopted while settling the boundary dispute also. Placing earth upon their heads, wearing red garlands and clothes and swearing etc. would impress upon the minds of the witnesses the sanctity and seriousness of their job.

*23 Evidence used to be oral and documentary. Documentary evidence was considered more valuable than the witnesses. But in the opinion of Bṛhaspati, undisturbed possession for three generations was of greater importance than all other evidence.[30]

*24 An ordeal was prohibited in the case of land dispute. The Smṛti-writers lay down that when human evidence is available, ordeals should not be resorted to.

*25 When the boundary was settled the village office had to keep records of rights.

*26 The visible marks such as different trees, plants, lakes, wells, temples, gardens etc. would not only serve the purpose of laying down a boundary but they could be useful in many other ways for the village community. Utility of trees for an agricultural community does not need explanation. Lakes and wells would supply water to the people. Temples could be meeting places, and schools for villagers. Gardens would be places of recreation or also meeting places for the villagers.

Conclusion

*27 The act of trespassing and encroacking upon the property of others is common in a growing society. Vigilance is necessary on the part of an administrator to prevent injustice and to maintain law and order in the society. From C. 600 B.C. we have evidence to show that private individuals could possess land, we know that Āmrapālī could give a gift of land to the Buddhist *Saṅgha*. People could freely give a gift of land, or sell their land or mortgage their land.[31]

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[30] *anumānādguruḥ sākṣī, sākṣibohyaḥ likhitam guru /*
avyāhatā tripuruṣi, bhuktirebhyaḥ garīyasī //
cf. P. V., Kane, *Hist. of D. S.*; Vol. III. p. 306.

[31] Altekar, A. S.; *State and Government in Ancient India*, p. 275.

It was necessary, therefore, for the law-givers to consider the various aspects of the boundary of lands and the settlement of a boundary dispute. The detailed discussion in the *Smṛticandrikā* has laid down the guide-lines for an administrator to solve a boundary dispute.

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SCIENCE AND SPIRITUALITY

By

THRITY G. VASWANI*

There are two great disciplines which have over the years systematized its methods, procedures. contents and its end-results and put it forth before humanity for its consumption. Although there is much that they share in common and much that they can lend to each other, yet for the past few centuries there has been a constant war waged between trying to establish one's supremacy over another. This is quite unnecessary for if they are "combined harmoniously, it can bring about an all round expression of human genius."

Scientific Discipline

There are two clear cut aspects of Science, namely, pure science and applied science. While the former deals with an objective inquiry in understanding the truth behind a phenomenon, the latter deals with translating these truths or laws into inventions or technologies for the betterment of mankind. Pure science is regarded as being 'lucifera' or light while applied science is regarded as 'fructifera' or fruit

These two are not separable entities; they always go hand-in-hand towards the evolvement of knowledge. Knowledge leads to power and power is utilized deliberately by mankind to gain control over the forces of nature to suit his needs.

Some of the important requirements that this discipline demands of its members is a passion for facts, dynamism, replicability and objectivity. The Scientist is always expected to keep an open mind right from when he starts pursuing the facts till he reaches the end of his experimentation and even years after that. No true scientist can claim his theory or findings to be irrefutable and absolute. He has to remain unemotional in discarding cherished theories if they are proved wrong and equally accepting new ones when proved right.

Spiritual Discipline .

Spirituality is being able to deeply understand one's own Ātman in the form of God-realization; cementing one's identity with the supreme spirit and experiencing the illuminated state. Its end-aim is the liberation of the spirit

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The method of reaching this is through the discovery and acceptance of some divine principle—whatever name one may give it. When one constantly continues to think, act and grow along the lines laid down by these principles, one becomes more and more perfect, divine.

Criticism levied against spiritual experiences attained through spiritual experimentation is that they are non-verifiable. This is not true. Such experiences are verified in the experiences of others through the ages. There is enough literature to support this which shows precisely what steps to follow in order to reach the end and the various stages one would pass through on one's way. Patañjali has explained this in his book titled "*Aphorism on Yoga*" and Nārada in his book on "*Aphorism on Devotion*". Even the "*Vedānta-Sāra*" shows us the non-dualistic approach for the realization of Ātman. Buddha's Eight-fold Path clearly indicates by what stages one who practises these disciplines, will attain *nirvāṇa*. Given the same practices, the same experiences will be had.

Goals of Science and Spirituality

The ultimate aim of both these disciplines is the attainment of happiness but the methods evolved are different.

Through Scientific knowledge man has been able to achieve many material comforts but happiness becomes transitory and elusive. Man, somehow, fails to find his satisfaction and is once again caught up in bettering his technology, discovering new frontiers of knowledge, revalidating the old theories and in the process evolving new ones as well. All this leads to strife, competitiveness and discontent, which is quite contrary to peace and harmony which was originally aimed for.

Since the scientific discipline fell short of its accomplishment since it was outward bound, man turned inwards in search of happiness and found that if true spirituality, devoid of its superficial trappings of rituals, miracles and superstitions, was practised sincerely, it leads to a state of internal harmony and happiness. The most essential aspect of this was that it was eternal and no external factors could affect it adversely.

Limitations of Science and Religion

Although Science has made tremendous strides in various walks of life which are very evident, yet science has owned up today that it deals with only the appearances of things and not the reality behind the appearances i.e. there is an unobservable universe behind the observable one. This is due to the fact that Science is dealing with phenomena revealed by senses or apparatus helpful to the senses; but as we know the senses themselves are so limited and therefore what is revealed is also limited leading us to the acceptance of the fact that there are realities behind the sense-world which determine as well as control the senses.

Albert Einstein in his book "*Out of My Later Years*" says that the scientific method can teach us nothing beyond how facts are related to, and conditioned, by each other. He further says that Science is a knowledge "What is" and not "What should be".

Spirituality itself is not limiting but when converted into particular religions which remain extremely dogmatic in their expression, that it runs the risk of missing out on its true essence. Spiritual practices when accompanied by superstitious practices tend to detract one from the ultimate goal to be reached.

Therefore, if both these disciplines accept their limitations—as they obviously seem to be conscious of it—concentration can be shifted to the areas of their mutuality in spite of their differences.

Points of differentiation and convergence between Science and Spirituality

Utility of Science is seen in day-to-day living while spirituality talks of benefits in terms of realizing the divinity within oneself and therefore in comparison, the former gains precedence to the common man in the present day.

Some of the essential differences between the two are that Science is concerned with phenomena of the external world while spirituality aims at the growth and laws of inner world of man. Secondly, the scientific discoveries are tangible and spectacular while spiritual discoveries are felt and cannot be objectively demonstrated before public. Nevertheless, they are as true as those of science.

While differing in these areas, both, to their credit, are constantly open to any individual to test the results for themselves through their own personal experience and experimentation. No scientist can hide the truth discovered by him or else he would very quickly be labelled as a magician. Science remains above board and is for ever ready to undergo any test.

Same is true with real spirituality. Through the ages no prophet has shied away from sharing the truth as experienced by him. In fact, the converse is true; for his greatness lies in the fact as to how he can transmit this truth even to the commonest of the common man.

Unfortunately spiritual truths are not considered to be knowledge in the true sense since they don't come from outside but evolve from within. These truths have to be tested by direct experience. Its effects are known only to the discoverer while others near about him are only able to see the indirect effects of this discovery on his life and in his conduct.

Scientific truths are constantly challenged and are constantly subjected to changes and modifications, while spiritual truths have stood the test of time, They are equally open to the common man to test them before accepting them; but what happens is that an ordinary person tests the saying of saints through the intellect which is no good for this matter. Just as special requirements and apparatuses are necessary in science so also inner discipline and regular practice s of prime importance in the testing of spiritual truths; but alas, very few are ready to fulfill these conditions and so they fail to arrive at correct conclusions.

Present Status of Science Vis-a-vis Spirituality

Always there is what is known as 'Zeitgeist' or the time-spirit which is he drift of thought and feeling in a period of history. This time-spirit, whether good or bad, always influences the future of mankind. Out of the type of today ve have, the tomorrow will emerge.

The present 'Zeitgeist' is dominated by a scientific temper. This did not come about automatically. For the past four centuries science has been waging an incessant war against intolerance and rigid religious dogmas and superstitions.

There has been a gradual fading of interest in religion because of the nterpretation made of it. It tries to impress people as seeking its own selfpresentation instead of it being a message of salvation.

Whether it is Science or spirituality or even spirituality in an organised orm of religion, it would cease to have its hold on humanity as soon as it turns logmatic and authoritarian. History has shown this to be true. Just as today Science holds sway over people's mind and behaviour, it can and will gradually all into decay if not used appropriately for the welfare of mankind and pirituality would once again establish its hold over humanity.

Today Science has gained such a great status in the world that religion now inds itself in a defensive position. It has now reached a state wherein religion equires the sanction of Science in order to survive.

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REVIEWS

The Bhāgavata-Purāṇa : A Critical Study by SUSHILA S. DESAI; Published by Parshva Prakashan, Ahmedabad, First Edition, 1990; Price Rs. 140 – 00; pp. xii + 260.

The Bhāgavata-Purāṇa (= BhP) is one of the eighteen *mahāpurāṇas* (“ Major Purāṇas ”) (*cf. purāṇāni. . . .mahānti. . . .* / BhP 12.7.22). It is taken as one of the *prasthānas* also by Ācārya Vallabha. There is a plethora of literature on the BhP and the book under review is a welcome addition to the existing literature on it.

It is felt that a brief history of the genesis of the book will not be out of place :—

The present theme was taken up by the authoress in 1941 A.D. for research leading to the Ph.D. degree of the University of Bombay, Bombay under the guidance of Shri Durgashankar Shastri. It was completed in 1955 A.D. Later events brought about a change in the of life of the authoress. It was, then, in May, 1987 that the authoress happened to visit Dr. H. C Bhayani, “who was one of the colleagues at the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, during 1941. . ” (Preface p. v.). He suggested its publication, as “ it still remained quite useful even after a lapse of three decades ” (Preface, p. v). The authoress rightly remarks that “ at the time when this study was prepared, no fulfledged study of the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa covering all its important aspects was available ” (Preface, p. vi). With the passage of time and with increasing facilities of research there is now a plethora of literature available on the BhP., but the present work does not lose its significance.

Dr. Smt. Desai endeavours “ to present descriptively and historically the main facts about the form, nature and contents of the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa with critical observations on numerous points. . . ” (Preface, p. vi). She has presented her study in the following ten chapters :—

1. Author of the BhP. : His date and domicile, 2. Analysis of the BhP., 3. Commentaries on the BhP., 4. Some Linguistic Peculiarities of the BhP.; 5. Metres of the BhP., 6. *Bhakti* in the BhP , 7. *Stotras* in the BhP., 8. Kṛṣṇa-carita, 9. The BhP. : A *Mahākāvya* and 10. The Philosophy of the BhP .

Journal of the Oriental Institute, Vol. 42, Nos. 1-2, September–December 1992 Issue. pp. 87-98.

Dr. N. M. Kansara has contributed two appendices, *viz*. 1. Appendix No. 1: (It is a summary of the " *Bhāgavata-Purāṇa: A Linguistic Study* " by Asutosh Sarma Biswas) and (ii) Appendix 2. (This is a summary of Chapter II : " ' Krishna in the Viṣṇu and the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa " (pp. 43-76) of Noel Sheth's " *The Divinity of Krishna.* ")

The problem of the date of the BhP is controversial. The authoress examines the internal and the external evidence and finally concludes " the ninth century as the safe date of its composition . . " (p. 14). According to her " the home of the author of the Bhāg. was south India." (p. 17). She notes " eighty-one Sanskrit Commentaries of the Bhāg." (p. 81). During the course of the treatment of different topics she refers to various readings of the commentators, but one misses her considered view in the matter. One has to wait for the final readings till the critical edition of the BhP is published by the B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad. It is well-known that " critically edited texts of Sanskrit works are *sine qua non* of any serious study and research relating to these works." [R. N. Dandekar, Foreword, (p. 3) to "*Vedic Texts: A Revision: Prof C. G. Kashikar Felicitation Volume*," Delhi, 1990].

The chapter on linguistic peculiarities is interesting and a few points may be referred to here. (i) In the context of the vocable *asutṛp* (BhP 4.29. 53; p. 92) it is noted that " its Vedic sense is profiting by another's life " (p. 92). It occurs thrice in the RV (10.87.7; 10.87.14; 10.14.12). It is rendered as " life-stealing " (RV 10.14.12) (*vide* Macdonell A. A., *A Vedic Reader for Students*, OUP, 1954, pp. 172; 225) and the verbal part is connected with √*tṛp*, " delight in " (*op.cit.*, p. 225). It is rendered also as " feeder on life, loving to snatch away life " (Velankar H. D., *Ṛksūktaśatī*, Bombay, 1972, pp. 254, 317) R. C. Hazra understands √*tṛp* in the vocable *paśutṛp* (RV 7. 86.5) in the sense of " to satisfy " (*vide Dr. R. C. Hazra Commemoration Volume* Part I, Varanasi, First Edition, p. 454). Metaphorically, the vocable *asutṛp* may be rendered as " enjoying one's life ", but as an adjective to *vṛkān* in BhP. 4.29.53 it may be rendered as " delighting in life " *i.e.* to say, " delighting in snatching away the life " (*vide* also the Gujarati translation of the BhP, Part I, published Sastu Sahitya-vardhak Karyalay, Bombay, 1978, p. 296). (ii) *carṣaṇīnām.* (10. 30. 2; this should be read as BhP 10. 29. 2) is another vocable listed under the section : " Archaism: (1) Lexical ". It has a remark : " of men, of people " (p. 93). In the RV it means " men, people. " (Velankar H. D., *op. cit.*, p. 323), hence there is nothing special about it; morever, it may be noted that the BhP is described as *nigama-kalpataror galitāṁ phalam*; hence the employment of Vedic words can be taken as natural. The vocable *carṣaṇī* is derivable from √*carṣ* (√*cṛṣ*) < *karṣ* (√*kṛṣ*). (*vide* Bhawe S. S.. *The Soma-Hymns of the Ṛgveda: A Fresh Interpretation*, Part I, 1957, Baroda, p. 6; PartII, 1960, Baroda, pp. 37, 52; Velankar H. D., *op.*

cit., p. 323). (iii) *vāśrā* (BhP 4. 9. 17; 10. 46. 9) is rendered as " (bellowing) cows (p. 94). It comes from √ *vāś*, to low, to bellow (Macdonell A. A., A Practical Sanskrit Ditionary, OUP., 1954, p. 278; Bhawe S. S., *op.cit.*, Part II, p. 12); one may understand it as a " lowing cow ". (Macdonell A. A., *op.cit.*, p. 278) In the Ṛgvedic Soma-context √ *vāś* carries an erotic sense (*cf.* Rv. 9. 14. 4; 9.66. 11; *vide* Bhawe S. S.; *op. cit*, Part II, p. 11; Part III, p. 97). In this context Dr. S. S. Bhawe observes that " the verb (*avāvaśanta*, bracket ours) is suggestive of the image of cows bellowing for the bull." (*op. cit.*, Part III, p. 106). It may also be noted that the BhP. 10.46.9 has an erotic air.

Some cases of change of *pada* (p, 95) are noted. One misses here whether the change of *pada* has or not any semantic value.

While discussing the vocable *ṛṣabha* (p. 100) the Gujarati vocable *sā̃ḍha* is given as a parallel semantically and is translated as " ox ".But an ox is a " castrated male of domestic species of these " (i.e oxen, bracket ours) (*The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English* compiled by F. G. Fowler and H. W. Fowler, Oxford, 1946, p. 566), " a male bovine animal, castrated and full grown." (*New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language*, College Edition, Delhi, 1979, p. 1062). It may be rendered by " bull " (*i.e.* male of a bovine animal) (*New Webster's Dictionary* p. 204). In the context of *pothayāmāsa* it is remarked, " generally epic." It may be noted that the vocable *apothayat* occurs in the *Saptaśatī* (7.12) (edited by A. N. Jani, Baroda, 1972, p. 178), which is a part of the Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāṇa which is one of the earlier Purāṇas. While discussing *bhakti* in the BhP Dr. Smt. Desai refers to the *sakhyabhakti* (p. 122). It may be observed that some Ṛgvedic passages indicate that the *sakhyabhakti* was known to the Vedic seers. (*Vide* Kane P. V., History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. V, Part II, Poona, 1962, p. 951; Kantawala S. G., Bhakti (Vedic and Purāṇic): Some Aspects, *Studies in Indology: Prof Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume*, Delhi, 1988-89, pp. 165 ff).

Dr. Sushila Desai deserves our hearty congratulations for publishing this valuable piece of research even at the " fag end.. of life " (Preface, p. vi). The publisher deserves also congratulations for publishing this useful book.

Vadodara

S. G. Kantawala

Dramatic Concepts, Greek and Indian: A Study of the Poetics and the Nāṭyaśāstra, by BHARAT GUPT, Pub. : D. K. Print-World (P), Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, pp i-xvii + 1-295, Price Rs. 290/-.

The work under review represents an attempt to compare and contrast the Indian and Greek theories of Dramatics. Earlier attempts in this field were mainly theoretical or verbal. The present author has viewed these two dramatic theories within the wider framework of ancient Indo-Greek, rather Indo-European, culture in their performance-aspect and has traced their origin in ritualistic or sacred enactments imbued with cosmic significance, oriented from the start to please the deities as well as men. The author gives this ancient phenomenon the significant name "hiero-praxis". Instead of treating the "*Poetics*" and the Bharata's "*Nāṭyaśāstra*" as two distinct lines of evolution of dramatics, he regards them as a cultural phenomenon emerging from a common world-view, the one of which viz. "poetics" in the Europe, only assuming different secular realistic line of development in later times, due to Geographico-social reasons discussed in detail in the first part, i.e. the Introduction.

According to the author, the "hiero praxis" from the beginning required certain synthetic production-techniques in which music, dance and semiotized gesture were unified to give rise to "performance-text" or manual which the *Poetics* and *Nāṭyaśāstra*, in their essential original character, are. Thus the present study lays stress on the techniques of production, that is to say, the dramatic elements of theatrical representation.

The aim of such theatrical representation, according to the author, is not to depict reality but to transform it by creating a world of its own by using the artifices, aural, visual and others, so as to arouse in the spectator an emotional note which becomes instrumental in bringing about psychological relief, leading to spiritual elevation—a trans-mundane experience-akin to pure spiritual bliss.

The methodology adopted in this excellent study is both comparative and critical at the same time. The author has based his observations and conclusions on the textual and other evidence, imparting to the work an authoritative and objective character.

I congratulate both the author and the publisher for this brilliant literary production with aesthetically satisfying format and get-up and held readable types which will assuredly find its *niche* in the libraries of great Research Institutions and Universities of the world.

Vadodara,
February, 25, 1994.

R. T. VYAS

The Experiential Dimension of Advaita Vedanta by ARVIND SHARMA, pub. Motilal Banarsidass publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, pp. i-Xiv+1-116, Price: Rs. 125/-

The book under review is an attempt to achieve what is logically impossible. The Upaniṣads affirm; " There is no diversity here," or " There is one Reality." Now the ordinary human experience is characterised by diversity which does not seem to be reducible to unity, by any amount of logical reasoning. The present work tries to show how can the logical impossibility, referred to above, be reconciled. This appearent impossible task is successfully accomplished by an objective analysis of ordinary human experience during the three states of consciousness, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep. Especially, the experience of dreamless sleep which cannot be reasonably be proved to be an absolute void, provides a cue to the real nature of man, characterized by absolute unity in which even the slightest division or differentiation cannot be introduced by any means. This state of absolute non-duality, experienced by all, can be attained with full consciousness, if one divests oneself of all thoughts which cause the rising of individuality-the initial point of self-differentiation-and the world set over against that individuality. In short, by suitable practice of eliminating thought-process one can gain access to that perennially neglected and unexplored dimension of one's own being wherein uncompromising unity reigns supreme.

The author has cited the instances of Sri Ramana Maharsi and Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj who had been abiding in and as that non-dual Reality and by the power of such abidence, were capable of transmitting that transcendent experience of non-duality to all those who aspired for realizing the truth and who were spiritually ripe enough to receive the same.

The book is a must for those who would know the central thrust of Hinduism and also for those who would tread the path which directly leads to the summit of supreme spiritual experience of non-dual Self, as expounded in the Hindu scriptures and as testified by innumerable saints and sages, especially, the two modern sages whose teachings find a systematic exposition in it.

The bibliography, glossary and index enhance the value of the book which is produced with aesthetically satisfying format and get up.

R. T. VYAS

Vadodara,
19-4-1994

The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India, by JOHANNES BRONKHORST Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd.. Delhi. 1993, pp. i-xviii+1-153. Price Rs. 150/-

The present work under review is an attempt to retrieve the original, earliest doctrine of Buddhism and find out the early teachings and meditational practices, separating them from those that have found their way later on from the two parallel traditions of meditation, namely early Hindu and Jain meditational practices. The methodology adopted for doing this is comparative study of all these three traditions with a view to sifting those beliefs and practices which once having been accepted are rejected in some canonical works of Buddhism. Such equivocated meditational practices, as are found in any one of the two parallel traditions, have been decided to have been added later on and declared to be not forming part of the original teaching of the Buddha.

Following this method, the author has concluded that those meditative practices which are conducive to natural, spontaneous and easy withdrawal of senses and concentration of mind are original Buddhist, whereas such practices as involve coercion with body, breath, and mind are non-Buddhistic that is, they are either Hindu or Jain practices.

The author's statement " Vedic Literature is for the most part silent about any form of meditation. Not until the oldest upaniṣads do we find any reference to it. The earliest sentence that is of interest to us is *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.4.23 " (p. 112). In this regard, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that *Ṛgveda*, III 62.10, which is the famous *Gāyatrī Mantra*, inculcates meditation, with the word, *dhīmahi* " we meditate," on the effiugent light of the primeval creator, who inspires the intellect of people. On the basis of such direct references to meditation in the Vedic texts it has to be admitted that the Vedic seer-poets knew fully well the art and technique of meditation and the consequent realization of the non-dual Self which the Upaniṣads make their main occupation to elaborate. Moreover S. Radhakrishnan rightly states: Early Buddhism is not an absolutely original doctrine. It is not a freak in the evolution of Indian thought". (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 360) Buddha himself can be shown to have been influenced by the ideas of Yājñavalkya, vide my article " Yājñavalkya and Buddha ", *Journal of The M. S. University af Baroda*, Vol. XXXV-XXXVI (1986-87) No. 1, (Humanities Number) pp. 73-83. In Radhakrishnan's words " Buddhism, in its origin at least, is an off-shoot of Hinduism " (op.cit., p. 361).

Moreover, David Frawley in his works: " *Wisdom of the Ancient seers* ", " *Secrets af the Ṛg Veda* " and " *Gods, sages and kings: Vedic secrets of Ancient Civilization* " has with an array of internal evidence, attempted to show that the Vedas have grown from yogic and spiritual milieu.

Buddha himself pays homages to earlier saints, and Brāhmaṇas who had attained enlightenment through meditation and calls the path he teaches as the ancient Āryan path. It would therefore be erroneous to maintain that before the Buddha the technique of tranquil meditation did not exist, or that the seedless state of mind is contribution of the Buddhist meditation.

The book however is very interesting and stimulating as the author has taken all pains to present the three parallel traditions of meditation, in great detail and with critical approach.

The list of works that form the primary source and the Index at the end of the book enhance its value.

Vadodara,
31-12-'93

R. T. VYAS

Nāgārjuniana :

Studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna, by Chr. Lindtner, Pub.: Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1987 pp. 1 to 327 price: Rs. 100/-

The present work is revised and amplified version of the earlier unpublished work by the author on the same subject. Herein he proposes to deal with thirteen works of Nāgārjuna which the author considers to be genuine or rightly ascribed to him, by way of either editing, analysing or translating. In the beginning he has taken a review of the *Magnum opus* of Nāgārjuna namely '*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Prajñānāma*' (M. M.) which is a statement of the resulting wisdom attained by those who follow the meditative path, compassionately revealed by the Buddha, the exalted enlightened one.

Out of the above fifty works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the author has singled out twelve, in addition to M. M., as being authentic on the strength of internal as well as external criteria, such as closeness to the doctrine and style of MM; consistency with regard to Indian, Chinese and Tibetan tradition and the fact of their being ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Bhavya, Candra Kīrtī, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila, and the like.

The titles of the thirteen works dealt with in this volume are arranged in such a way as to conform to the prescriptive distinction of dialectic or *yukti* and didactic or *Āgama*. They are :—

I. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*
II. *Śūnyatāsaptati*
III. *Vigrahavyāvartanī*
IV. *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*

V. *Vyavahārasiddhi*
VI. *Yuktiśaṣṭikā*
VII. *Catuḥstava*
VIII. *Ratnāvalī*
IX. *Pratiyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā*
X. *Sūtrasamuccaya*
XI. *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*
XII. *Suhṛllekhā*
XIII. *Bodhisaṁbhāra (ka)*

On the basis of his close study of Nāgārjuna's works the author sketches the outline of the remarkable personality of : Nāgārjuna he was an ardently devoted Mahāyānist who thought it his obligation to propagate the true faith; his learning was not confined to the Buddhist lore alone, but was quite extensive; his main concern was to free the followers of Abhidharma from narrow dogmatic attitude and recognize the reasonableness and peace-bestowing property of the doctrine of emptiness of all phenomena; he was closely connected with court and held responsible monastic offices; he attempted to convert some Brahmin logicians and aimed also to influence the lay people and attract them to the true faith.

In an extremely brief statement of the unity of Nāgārjuna's thought, the author rightly states that if one would condense his system in all its aspects to one term, one should choose *bodhisādhanā* " and not *śūnyatā* or *pratītyasamutpāda*.

He traces the source of *avidyā*, the initial stage from where the twelve *nidānas* emanate as a concatenation according to the theory of dependent-origination, to four *viparyāsa* or distorted understandings, namely, viewing non-self as the self, momentary as eternal, suffering as happiness and inauspicious as auspicious. And further he shows that this four-fold *viparyāsa* is rooted in the assumption of *asti* or existence *nāsti* or non-existence. This dischotomy is fundamental cause of *Saṁsāra*.

The work is well-produced with exequisite fromat and will certainly pave the way for further research in the specific, area of Nāgārjuna's contribution to the Mahāyāna-Philosophy.

Vadodara,
Date : 23-12-1992.

R. T. VYAS

Select Bibliography of Rāmāyaṇa—Related Studies, Ananthacharya Indological Research Institute Series No. XXI, Compiled by H. DANIEL SMITH, Published by Ananthacharya Indological Research Institute, Bombay-400 005, 1989, pp. i+vii+127+ii, Price: Rs. 40/-

As made clear at the outset in his introduction by the learned author Dr. Daniel Smith the work done earlier on the *Bibliography of the Rāmāyaṇa* by Gore N. A. has since served three generations of scholars as the standard reference despite its many incomplete entries. Gore attempted to record everything known at that time to him, so he included texts, editions, translations, adaptations, critical literature, books and articles in English, French, German, Sanskrit, Marathi, Bengali, Hindi etc. His list yielded 366 titles. Dr. Smith specifically states that his bibliography differs from Gore's in that it lists only materials in English; further, it focuses on *Rāmāyaṇa*—derived studies and omits texts, editions, translations and the like. However this work registers more titles for the simple reason that much has been produced in *Rāmāyaṇa*-related scholarship since Gore's earlier inventory. Dr. Smith has omitted the notice of the remarkably rich and diverse current research in *Rāmāyaṇa*—related studies in other European and Asian languages and has concentrated on the research on the said topic in English only. According to him a separate study of *Rāmāyaṇa* scholarship in sources other than English is a desideratum. As stated by the learned author the focus herein is on India alone excluding materials relating to *Rāmāyaṇa* traditions in other parts of South, Southeast, East Asia and the rest of the world. Similarly the focus here is mainly on Vālmīki and only samplings have been selected from the substantial secondary studies based on other authors like Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti etc. and the entries based on the works of Ezuttaccan, Kamban, Kṛttivāsa and other regional transmitters of the Rāma—tradition are exemplary rather than exhaustive.

The entries are listed alphabetically according to authors' surnames in an excellent manner. A topical index provided at the end of the work to find material on a number of specific topics increases the value of this work substantially. The serially recorded entries have reached the number 1261 and have covered up considerable portion of the *Rāmāyaṇa*—related studies in English, the world over. This work of the learned author has drawn attention of the world of scholars to many valuable books and articles on the said subject published before its own coming to light. The usefulness of the work has been increased by the fine pertinent remarks of the author e.g. under entry nos. 73, 83, 102, 396; his informative remarks under entry nos. 196, 537, 933, 1048, 1066, 1156, 1249; his useful remarks under entry nos. 248, 272, 342; his impartial balanced criticism under entry nos. 83, 147, 254, 679 etc.

However a few mistakes have crept in in this otherwise excellent work e.g. under entry no. 964 Vol. VIII (1975) is wrongly recorded. It should be Vol. VII (1975). Moreover under entry no. 1254 the abbreviation JAS is used but it is not recorded with its full form while recording abbreviations on pp. v and vi. Under entry no. 265 between 1971 and 86 pp. blank space or lacuna is found.

In the introduction on p. i it is stated that there has not been a bibliography targeted on *Rāmāyaṇa*---related research since 1947 when Gore published his list.... but actually under entry no. 342 it is stated.... privately published by author, 1943. So either of the two 1947 or 1943 must be a mistake. Similarly in the introduction on p. iii para 2 it is found--(see entry 1045 infra). But the said work of the selfsame writer (who happens to be the writer of the work under review) which was referred to is found under entry no. 1046. Besides there are some printing mistakes that have crept in e g. under entry no. 179 instead of *Rām-Kathā* (*Utpatti aur U. Kas*) it should be (*Utpatti aur Vikasa*); under entry no. 467 instead of tangentialey it should be tangentially; under entry no. 503 instead of Geneology it should be Genealogy; under 939 instead of introcude it should be introduce; under 663 instead of Madres it should be Madras; under 692 instead Majumder it should be Majumdar; under 709 instead of Pased it should be based; and under 1196 instead of *Raghvaṁśa* it should be *Raghuvaṁśa*. Under 938 the abbreviation used is JJCL but on p. vi it is explained as Jadavapur Journal of Comparative Study instead of Learning.

In spite of the errors noted above the author amply deserves praise and congratulations.

Vadodara,
7-4-1994

B. N. BHATT

Śrī Kavi Karṇer Pālā (*Pālās of Śrī Kavi Karṇa*), Compiled and Edited by BISHNUPADA PANDA, Published by Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi and Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 1991, Four Vols. 4, 5, 6, 7, pp. I-CI + 1.50, Price: Rs. 1200 (for one set).

The work under review is a compilation and edition alongwith translation of the twentyone *Pālās* (religious songs) which sing the eternal glory, magnificient supreme power, diverse miraculous activities and compassion of Satyanārāyaṇa who is identified with Satyapīra in the *Palās*. These are named as *Satyanārāyaṇa Ākoṭi Pālā*, *Satyanārāyaṇa Pālā*, *Madanasundara Pālā* etc. and are composed by Śrī Kavi Karṇa, a pseudonym of the talented Oriya poet of the 17th century and a prolific writer in Bengali, though, according to the traditional theory, Kavi Karṇa is known as the author of the sixteen *Pālās*. This commendable work has appeared in four volumes under *Kalāmūlaśāstra* series of Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts as 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the series.

All these *Pālās* were composed in Bengali in the late seventeenth century. In the contemporary Orissan society, recitation of these *Pālās*, *Satyanārāyaṇa Pūjā*, and partaking *Śiriṇī* — a typical Muslim *Prasāda* offering to Satyapīra who has been identified with Satyanārāyaṇa, a Hindu God is a living tradition. This socio-religious-cultural tradition is very old and in the present Orissan society it is prevailing in wide circle and highly honoured with due respect and devotion. From the birth-year of a child in Orissan society upto his sixteen years, one *Pālā* on every year to celebrate birthday in the traditional way, *Pālās* are sung by the priests or Brahmins. Even it is known that the Oriyan people who are devoid of sons pray to Satyapīra alias Satyanārāyaṇa with the promise of offering these *Pālās* to Him, if their prayer would be granted and they would be blessed with sons. Further, it is significant to say, as Dr. Kapila Vatsyayana says in her Foreword to the work. " The *Satyanārāyaṇa Kathā* and *Satyanārāyaṇa Pūjā*, known practically to every Hindu-household has so far been considered as popular literature, what may be called the living tradtion. A deeper probe into this living tradition of *Satyānārāyaṇa Kathā* and *Satyanārāyaṇa Pūjā* has revealed that there is sizable body of literature in many libraries of India where *Satyanārāyaṇa Kathā, Pūjā* and *Vrata* are mentioned in detail. A perusal of the manuscripts in different parts of India available in Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Kannada and other languages, shows that there are many vital links between the written textual material and popular performance of it as part of life-style ". With this idea in view, Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts being committed to identify texts and traditions which are Pan-Indian or pervasive, persuaded Dr. Panda to examine, collate, edit and translate the *Pālās* of Kavi Karṇa preserved in the manuscript collection of Orissa State Museum, Bhubaneswar. Dr. Panda, known for his deep erudition and eminent scholarship has done the job commendably and successfully. He has most judiciously selected this material ably edited the texts and gave us an eminently readable translation. By doing this, he has brought to light the commendable attempt of Kavi Karṇa directed for cultural synthesis on a religious and ritual planes. Since the editor has throughout relied on the original manuscripts as his primary source of information and also has taken into account the secondary sources, the work is authentic and objective. His deep insight into the subject and his profound erudition which is evidently clear in the works make the works a systematic product of pioneering research.

This work contains a comprehensive introduction which makes very clear about the origin, development and the present condition of the *Pālā*-tradition in Orissa alongwith Kavi Karṇa's detailed biographical sketch. *Pālās* are presented both in Bengali and Hindi languages and thereby the scope of the works is extended.

This work, as a whole fills a lacuna felt so far in the literature of existing stock of Pālā-tradition. It is, therefore, destined to occupy a legitimate place of pride in the libraries of Colleges, Universities and the prominent research Institutions. The volumes which are neatly printed, make a fascinating reading.

The editor deserves our hearty congratulations for doing competently such a great task of examing, collating, editing and translating the *pālās* of Kavi Karṇa in English. Let us hope and wish to have many more valuable works from the pen of the learned Professor Bishnupada Panda in the years to come.

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1. *Pañcasiddhāntikā of Varāha Mihira with Translation and Notes:* By T. S. Kuppanna Sastry, Critically Edited with Introduction & Appendices by K. V. Sarma, Pub. by P. P. S. T. Foundation, P.O.B. 2080, Adyar, Madras-600020 (India). First Edition 1993, pp. XXX+1-382, Price: Rs. 350/-

Publications of M/s. D. K. Print World (P) Ltd., H-12, Bali Nagar, New Delhi-110 015.

2. *Karma and Reincarnation:* (The Vedāntic Perspective): By Swami Muni Narayana Prasad, First Pub. in India in 1994, pp. 108 Price: Rs. 50/-
3. *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad*: (with original text in Roman transliteration, English translation and appendices), Commentary by Nitya Chaitanya Yati Vol. I: Madhu Kanda, First Pub. in India in 1994, pp. xxviii+656, Price: Rs. 300/-
4. *The Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (with the original text in Sanskrit and Roman transliteration), Translation with an Exhaustive Commentary by Swami Muni Narayana Prasad, 1994, pp. 212 Price: Paperback Rs. 95/- Hardbound Rs 125/-.
5. *The Bhagavad Gitā*: *A Sublime Hymn of Yoga:* Composed by the Ancient Seer Vyāsa, Translated from Sanskrit by Nataraja Guru with Explanatory Dialogue by Nitya Chaitanya Yati, 2nd Edition 1993, pp. xvi+1-472, Price Rs. 295/-.

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

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